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TITLE:	ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS OF B-52/FB-111 AMAC
	AND RELEASE CIRCUITRY UTILIZING SNEAK CIRCUIT
	ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES - FINAL REPORT.
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ABSTRACT

This report summarizes the results of an electrical circuitry analysis of B-52G and FB-111A aircraft monitor and control (AMAC) interfaces with nuclear weapons. The B-52G interface with the AGM-69A missile was also analyzed. Sneak circuit analysis techniques were used to produce network trees. The network trees provided necessary circuit topology for power and load analysis to identify feasible power sources to nuclear weapon interfaces in normal and abnormal environments. Preliminary results were presented to Air Force Weapons Laboratory/SEC, Kirtland AFB, on 1 October 1975 for use in a nuclear safety evaluation study.

KEY WORDS

Air Force Weapons Laboratory/SEC
AGM-69A Missile
Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC)
B-52G Aircraft
Electrical Circuitry Analysis
FB-111A Aircraft
Network Trees
Nuclear Safety Evaluation
Power and Load Analysis
Sneak Circuit Analysis
Topology

ARRANGEMENT

Document Number	<u>Title</u>	Subject
D2-1185761-1	Final Report	Electrical Analysis of B-52/FB-111 AMAC and Release Circuitry Utilizing Sneak Circuit Analysis Techniques
D2-1185761-2	B-52 Network Trees	B-52 AMAC and Release Circuitry
D2-1185761-3	FB-111 Network Trees	FB-111 AMAC and Release Circuitry

CONTENTS

SECTION		PAGE
1.0	SUMMARY	1-1
1.1	OBJECTIVE	1-1
1.2	SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS	1-1
1.3	CONCLUSIONS	1-6
1.4	RECOMMENDATIONS	1-6
2.0	ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION	2-1
2.1	SCOPE	2-1
2.1.1	CONFIGURATION	2-1
2.1.1.1	B-52G, SERIAL NUMBER 59-2602	2-1
2.1.1.2	FB-111A, SERIAL NUMBER 69-6514	2-2
2.1.1.3	ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS	2-2
2.1.2	DEFINITIONS	2-3
2.2	TASK DESCRIPTIONS	2-5
2.2.1	DATA REQUIREMENTS AND HANDLING - TASK 1	2-5
2.2.2	ELECTRICAL PATHS AND NETWORK TREES - TASK 2	2-5
2.2.3	SNEAK CIRCUIT ANALYSIS - TASK 3	2-5
2.2.4	POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS - TASK 4	2-6
2.2.5	DOCUMENTATION - TASK 5	2-6
2.2.5.1	POTENTIAL SNEAK CIRCUIT CONDITIONS	2-6
2.2.5.2	UNDESIRABLE CIRCUIT CONDITIONS	2-6
2.2.5.3	DRAWING ERRORS	2-7
2.2.5.4	ANALYSIS EFFORT SUMMARY	2-7
2.3	METHODS	2-7
2.3.1	SNEAK CIRCUIT ANALYSIS METHODS	2-7
2.3.1.1	INPUT PHASE	2-9
2.3.1.2	COMPUTER PROCESSING PHASE	2-9
2.3.1.3	ANALYSIS PHASE	2-9
2.3.2	POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS METHOD	2-13

CONTENTS (Continued)

SECTION		PAGE
2.3.2.1	DEFINITION OF ENVIRONMENTS AND FAULT MODES	2-13
2.3.2.2	NORMAL CONDITION CALCULATIONS	2-14
2.3.2.3	FAULT CONDITION CALCULATIONS	2-14
3.0	SNEAK CIRCUIT ANALYSIS OF B-52G & FB-111A	3-1
3.1	SUMMARY	3-1
3.2	CONDITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS	3-1
3.3	NETWORK TREES	3-1
3.4	SNEAK CIRCUIT REPORTS	3-2
3.5	DESIGN CONCERN REPORTS	3-13
3.6	DRAWING ERROR REPORTS	3-19
4.0	POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS	4-1
4.1	POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS - B-52G	4-2
4.1.1	SUMMARY	4-2
4.1.2	CONDITIONS	4-2
4.1.3	IDENTIFICATION OF CIRCUITS	4-5
4.1.4	NORMAL ENVIRONMENTS.	4-5
4.1.5	ABNORMAL ENVIRONMENTS	4-5
4.1.5.1	GROUND RULES & ASSUMPTIONS	4-11
4.1.6	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGES	4-16
4.1.6.1	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, Pin <u>d</u>	4-17
4.1.6.2	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PIN J13, 14T	4-24
4.1.6.3	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PINS W, Y & J11, 12T	4-31
4.1.6.4	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PINS C, f, Z, a	4-38
4.1.6.5	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PIN <u>h</u>	4-45
4.1.6.6	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PINS F, H, J & c	4-53
4.1.6.7	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PINS P, E, G, L, D, B, A & R	4-62
4.1.6.8	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PIN X	4-73
4.1.7	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGES - B-52/AGM-69A	4-79

CONTENTS (Continued)

SECTION	. •	PAGE
4.1.7.1	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, AGM PIN 97	4-80
4.1.7.2	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, AGM PINS 82, 92 & 96	4-90
4.1.7.3	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, AGM PIN 57 ON LAUNCHER	4-97
4.1.7.4	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, AGM PINS 10, 26 & 2	4-104
4.1.7.5	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, AGM PIN 57 ON LEFT PYLON	4-111
4.1.7.6	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, AGM PINS 82, 92 & 96 ON LEFT PYLON	4-118
4.1.7.7	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, AGM PIN <u>r</u>	4-126
4.1.7.8	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, AGM PINS 20 & 60	4-132
4.2	POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS - FB-111A	4-138
4.2.1	SUMMARY	4-138
4.2.2	CONDITIONS -	4-138
4.2.3	IDENTITY OF CIRCUITS	4-152
4.2.4	NORMAL ENVIRONMENT	4-152
4.2.5	ABNORMAL ENVIRONMENTS	4-153
4.2.5.1	GROUND RULES	4-153
4.2.6	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGES - FB-111	4-154
4.2.6.1	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PIN P .	4-155
4.2.6.2	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PINS A, H, J, Y, X, Z, d, e, f	4-164
4.2.6.3	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PINS L, N, <u>a</u> , <u>c</u>	4-177
4.2.6.4	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PIN <u>b</u>	4-190
4.2.6.5	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PINS C, G, R	4-200
4.2.6.6	CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE, PINS S, V & W	4-213
4.3	ACCIDENT ANALYSIS	4-222
4.3.1	PURPOSE	4-222
4.3.2	SOURCE DATA	4-222
4.3.3	CRASH/FIRE DAMAGE ANALYSIS	4-224

CONTENTS (Continued)

SECTION	PAGE
4.3.4 FINDINGS	4-224
4.3.5 CONCLUSIONS	4-228
BOUND WITH REPORT:	
APPENDIX A B-52G/FB-111A TECHNICAL DATA	A LIST A-1
BOUND SEPARATELY:	
VOLUME 2 B-52G NETWORK TREES	B-1 through B-257
VOLUME 3 FB-111A NETWORK TREES	C-1 through C-295

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE		PAGE
2.3-1 2.3-2 2.3-3	B-52/FB-111 ANALYSIS WORK FLOW SNEAK CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WORK FLOW ELECTRICAL NETWORK NODE TOPOGRAPHS	2-8 2-10 2-12
	DESIGN CONCERN REPORT B-52G-2 DRAWING ERROR REPORT B-52G-1 DRAWING ERROR REPORT FB-111A-1 DRAWING ERROR REPORT FB-111A-2 DRAWING ERROR REPORT FB-111A-3	3-3 3-5 3-7 3-9 3-11 3-14 3-17 3-20 3-21 3-23 3-25
3.6-6	DRAWING ERROR REPORT FB-111A-5	3-27
4.1-A 4.1-B 4.1-C 4.1-D 4.1-E	GRAVITY BOMB WEAPON INTERFACES SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF WEAPON ARMING CIRCUIT AGM-69A MISSILE INTERFACE AGM-69A SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC - ARMING CIRCUITS GRAVITY BOMB CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP TIME VS	4-9
4.1-F	MAXIMUM CURRENT AGM-69A CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP TIME VS CURRENT	4-12
4.1-G	2, 5, 10 AND 20A BREAKERS AGM-69A CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP TIME VS CURRENT	4-13
4.1-H	7, 15, AND 35A BREAKERS AGM-69A CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP TIME VS CURRENT	4-14
4.1-1 4.1-2 4.1-3 4.1-4 4.1-5	60A BREAKER NETWORK TREE NO. 0200 CABLE DRAWING POWER PATHS THROUGH DCU-9/A TESTER POWER PATHS THROUGH SWK BOX NETWORK TREE NO. 80	4-15 4-20 4-21 4-22 4-23 4-27
4.1-6 4.1-7 4.1-8	CABLE DRAWING POWER PATHS THROUGH DCU-9/A TESTER	4-28 4-29
4.1-9 4.1-10	POWER PATHS THROUGH SWK BOX NETWORK TREE NO. 83 CABLE DRAWING	4-30 4-34 4-35
4.1-11 4.1-12 4.1-13 4.1-14	POWER PATHS THROUGH SWK BOX POWER PATHS THROUGH DCU-9/A TESTER NETWORK TREE NO. 0198 CABLE DRAWING	4-36 4-37 4-41 4-42
4.1-15 4.1-16 4.1-17 4.1-18	POWER PATHS THROUGH DCU-9/A TESTER POWER PATHS THROUGH SWK BOX NETWORK TREE NO. 201/248 CABLE DRAWING	4-43 4-44 4-49 4-50
4.1-19 4.1-20	POWER PATHS THROUGH DCU-9/A TESTER POWER PATHS THROUGH SWK BOX	4-51 4-52

LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

FIGURE		PAGE
4.1-21 4.1-22 4.1-23 4.1-24	NETWORK TREE NO. 0199 CABLE DRAWING POWER PATHS THROUGH DCU-9/A TESTER POWER PATHS THROUGH SWK BOX	4-58 4-59 4-60 4-61
4.1-25 4.1-26	NETWORK TREE NO. 43B CABLE DRAWING	4-69 4-70
4.1-27 4.1-28	POWER PATHS THROUGH DCU-9/A TESTER POWER PATHS THROUGH SWK BOX	4-71 4-72
4.1-29 4.1-30	NETWORK TREE 202 POWER PATHS THROUGH DCU-9/A TESTER	4-76 4-77
	POWER PATHS THROUGH SWK BOX 1-50 (UNUSED)	4-78 4-87
4.1-51 4.1-52 4.1-53	NETWORK TREE NO. 99B-99C CABLE DRAWING NETWORK TREE NO. 118	4-89 4-95
4.1-54 4.1-55	CABLE DRAWING NETWORK TREE 151	4-96 4-102
4.1-56 4.1-57	CABLE DRAWING NETWORK TREE NO. 144-145	4-103 4-109
4.1-59 4.1-59 4.1-60	CABLE DRAWING NETWORK TREE NO. 153 CABLE DRAWING	4-110 4-116 4-117
4.1-61 4.1-62	NETWORK TREE NO. 175 CABLE DRAWING	4-123 4-124
4.1-63 4.1-64	NETWORK TREE NO. 148 CABLE DIAGRAM	4-130 4-131
4.1-65 4.2-A 4.2-B	CABLE DRAWING SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC - CIRCUITS TO AMAC SPU TYPICAL AMAC SPU	4-137 4-141 4-142
4.2-C 4.2-D	PIVOT PYLON AMAC SPU LOCATION. WEAPON STATION 3 CIRCUITRY	4-143 4-144
4.2-E 4.2-F	WEAPONS BAY AMAC SPU LOCATION WEAPON STATION R CIRCUITRY	4-147 4-148
4.2-1 4.2-2 4.2-3	NETWORK TREE NO. 334 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION R	4-160 4-161 4-162
4.2-4 4.2-5	NETWORK TREE NO. 365 NETWORK TREE NO. 300	4-171 4-172
4.2-6 4.2-7	FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION R	4-173 4-174
4.2-8 4.2-9 4.2-10	NETWORK TREE NO. 352 NETWORK TREE NO. 354 NETWORK TREE NO. 355/356	4-184 4-185 4-186
4.2-11 4.2-12	FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION R	4-187 4-188
4.2-13 4.2-14 4.2-15	NETWORK TREE NO. 318 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION R	4-196 4-197 4-198
7.6-10	I WORT DIWANNI MENTAN DIWITON N	4-130

LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

FIGURE		PAGE
4.2-16	NETWORK TREE/STATION 3 NETWORK TREE/STATION R	4-207 4-208
4.2-17 4.2-18	NETWORK TREE NO. 334	4-209
4.2-19 4.2-20	FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION R	4-210 4-211
4.2-21 4.2-22	NETWORK TREE NO. 364 NETWORK TREE NO. 360	4-217 4-218
4.2-23 4.2-24	FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPONS STATION R	4-219 4-220

'LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
1.2-1	POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS RESULTS	1-2
2.3-1	ENVIRONMENT AND FAULT MODES	2-13
4.1-A 4.2-1A 4.2-1 4.2-2 4.2-3 4.2-4 4.2-5 4.2-6 4.3-1 4.3-2 4.3-3	POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS SUMMARY - B-52G POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS SUMMARY - FB-111A POTENTIAL FAULT POWER SOURCES CRASH/FIRE DAMAGE - SOURCE DATA CRASH/FIRE DAMAGE ANALYSIS CRASH/FIRE DAMAGE ANALYSIS FINDINGS	4-3 4-139 4-163 4-175 4-189 4-199 4-212 4-221 4-223 4-225 4-227
<u></u>	B-52G DOCUMENTATION	A-1
A2	FB-111 DOCUMENTATION	A-8

1.0 SUMMARY

This report documents the electrical circuitry analysis performed by Boeing Aerospace Company - Houston on Air Force contract F29601-76-C-0017. The study contributed to the AFWL/SE nuclear safety evaluation of B-52 and FB-111 air-craft directed by a joint ERDA/DOD steering group. The effort primarily involved evaluation of aircraft monitor and control (AMAC) circuitry for possible sneak circuits, and for currents or voltages to weapon interface connectors in normal and abnormal environments. Necessary data and documentation tasks were also performed. This report summarizes the study approach and results. Analysis packages and network trees are provided for possible use in a combined evaluation of the aircraft and weapons.

1.1 OBJECTIVE

The primary objective of the analysis was to identify latent electrical circuit paths and conditions that can cause unwanted functions to occur or which could inhibit desired functions with or without component damage due to normal or abnormal environments.

1.2 SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS

The most significant sneak circuit found is a bus-to-bus tie on the FB-111A. This condition will exist when stores jettison relays are energized, causing loss of both MAU Fire 1 and 2 commands to all pivot pylons. The sneak circuit analysis provided baseline data for the power and load analysis. Network trees developed by this task are documented in Volumes 2 and 3 of the report. Section 3 contains thirteen reports of sneak circuits, design concerns and drawing errors.

The most significant finding of the power and load analysis is that most weapon interface pins can be exposed to either 24/28VDC or 118VAC power when electrical elements have been damaged under crash and fire environments. These are the maximum voltages found in adjacent circuitry. No unlimited power sources were found. Results are documented in Section 4 of this report. Table 1.2-1 summarizes normal and worst-case fault analysis results.

Power and Load Analysis Res. .s - B-52/Gravity Weapons Interface (Sheet 1 of 4) TABLE 1.2-1

	ANALYSIS PACKAGE	Section 4.1.6		4.1.6.7	4.1.6.7	4.1.6.4	4.1.6.7	- :	4.1.6.6	4.1.6.7	4.1.6.6	4.1.6.6	4.1.6.7		4.1.6.7	4.1.6.7		-:	₹		4.1.6.3	4.1.6.8	4.1.6.3	4.1.6.4	4.1.6.4	4.1.6.6	4.1.6.1	4.1.6.4	4.1.6.5
RESULTS	T CASE	4	noted.	1.4s	.8s	1.1s	.8s	.8s	1.2s	.8s	.8s	1.2s			.8s	.8s		.8s	. 8s		.8s	.8s	.8s	1.15	1.1s	1.2s	.8s	.8s	.8s
ANALYSIS	WORST	-	noted. otherwise n	109A	152A	110A	152A	211A	109A	152A	150A	109A	152A		258A	152A		1170A	1000A		800A	152A	800 A	110A	110A	109A	152A	218A	152A
ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS	ABNORMAL	۸	less otherwise noted. 400 Hz unless otherwise ∫	247	247	247	247	24V	247	247	247	247	247		247	247		287	280		287	247	287	247	247	240	247	24V	247
Ē		42		3.5s	,	ı	j	1.0s	ı	,	,	ı	1	-	0.8s	1		•	!		,	,	1	1	,	ı	ı	•	1
	NORMAL	-	Power is DC ur AC current is	75A	0	0	0	131A	0	0	0	0	0		152A	0		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		>	Note: P	247	0	0	0	24V	0	0	0	0	0	GROUND	247	Ó	GROUND	0	0	GROUND	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NEADON	INTERFACE	FUNCTION	Forward Bomb Bay Clip- In Connectors	FIN	SW GND	₹	ER SW A	Ž	TESTER SW SAFE	INFLIGHT TEST	TESTER SW, READY	TESTER SW. AIR		WPN GROUND	IFC SAFING PWR	_1	WPN GROUND	IFI PWR,		WPN GROUND		EN)	FWD IFI PWR, 15A				IFC RELAY (FWD)	TESTER SW, READY	FWD BOMB BAY SAFE
		DESIGNATOR	All4, Jll, Jl2, Jl3, and Jl4	Pin A	മ	ပ	٥	ייו	Ŀ	5	x	ŗ	_	٥	۵	œ	S	-	J13,14T	> >	3	×	>	7	ಹ	v	0	Ψ.	£

TABLE 1.2-1 Power and Load Analysis Results - B-52/AGM-69 Interfaces (Sheet 2 of 4)

	The state of the s				ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS	ANALYSIS	RESUL TS	
	INTERFACE		NORMAL		ABNORMAL	L - WORST	T CASE	ANALYSIS PACKAGE
DESIGNATOR	FUNCTION	٨	-	ţ	Λ .	-	t	Section 4.1.7
31	Missile Connector							
Pfn 2	BATTERY ACTIVATE PYLON LAUNCHER	88	88		118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s	4.1.7.4
00	ACCUMULATOR ACT. PYLON LAUNCHER	66	88	, ,	118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s	4.1.7.4
20	SAF CLASS III A CMD. PYLON LAUNCHER	66	9 8	• •	118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s	4.1.7.8
56	FIN UNLOCK PYLON LAUNCHER	88	00 0	, ,	118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s .125s	4.1.7.4
57	PROPULSION SAFE PYLON LAUNCHER	86	00	• •	28V 28V	1115A 411A	1.5s 2.0s	4.1.7.5 4.1.7.3
09	SAF CLASS III B CMD. PYLON LAUNCHER	66	0 A		118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s .13s	4.1.7.8
82, 92, 96	MISSILE ELECTRONIC POWER PYLON SYS. ON SYS. OFF LAUNCHER SYS. ON SYS. OFF	286 288 00	254A 0A 368A 0A	.25	28V 28V 28V 28V	1115A 1115A 1220A 1220A	2. C. C. C. S.	4.1.7.6 4.1.7.6 4.1.7.2
76	SAF PREARM CMD. PYLON LAUNCHER	88	కక	.1 1	118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s	4.1.7.1
. le	Ejector Connector							
Pin r	ARM SOLENOID PYLON LAUNCHER	88	88	1 1	27 27.	37A 54A	2.1 2.1 3.1	4.1.7.7

TABLE 1.2-1 Power and Load Analysis Results - 8-52/AGM-69 Interfaces (Sheet 2 of 4)

ĺ	je je	Ì					D2-1	18576\-\	1				,
	ANALYSIS PACKAGE	Section 4.1.7		4.1.7.4	4.1.7.4	4.1.7.8	4.1.7.4	4.1.7.5	4.1.7.8	4.1.7.6	4.1.7.1		4.1.7.7
RESULTS	WORST CASE	4		.125s	.1255	.1255	.125s	1.5s 2.0s	.125s	2	.125s .13s		1.18
ANALYSIS	ABNORMAL - WOR	1		983A 900A	983A 900A	983A 900A	983A 900A	1115A 411A	983A 900A	1115A 1115A 1220A 1220A	983A 900A		37A 54A
ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS		٨		118VAC 118VAC	118VAC 118VAC	118VAC 118VAC	118VAC 118VAC	28V 28V	118VAC 118VAC	28V 28V 28V 28V	118VAC 118VAC		27. 27.
	NORMAL	4		1 1	1 1		1 1	, ,	; ;	.45s	, ,		!!
		1		88	88	88	88	88	8 8	254A 0A 368A 0A	88		88
-		٨		66	-88	66	66	66	66	286 C8	86		86
MERDON	INTERFACE	FUNCTION	Missile Connector	BATTERY ACTIVATE PYLON LAUNCHER	ACCUMULATOR ACT. PYLON LAUNCHER	SAF CLASS III A CMD. PYLON LAUNCHER	FIN UNLOCK PYLON LAUNCHER	PROPULSION SAFE PYLON LAUNCHER	SAF CLASS III B CMD. PYLON LAUNCHER	MISSILE ELECTRONIC POWER PYLON SYS. ON SYS. OFF LAUNCHER SYS. ON SYS. OFF	SAF PREARM CMD. PYLON LAUNCHER	Ejector Connector	ARM SOLENOID PYLON LAUNCHER
		DESIGNATOR	31	Pin 2	. 10	50	56	57	09	82, 92, 96	26	JI.	Pin r

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	INTERFACE		NORMAL		ABNORYAL		WORST CASE	ANALYSIS PACKAGE
DESIGNATOR	FUNCTION	-	1	-	^	-	 	Cartion A 2 6
3479013-3	WPN STATION 3						,	35001011 4.5.0
Pin A	SAFE INPUT	287	608A	.68	287	608A	S	4.2.6.2
മധ	(NONE) SAFE INDICATION	287	48mA		28V	608A	.6s/-*	4.2.6.5
6 W L	(NONE) GROUNDED GROUNDED	00		**************************************	115VAC	198m A		
. o	WPN PRESENT (GROUND)	287	48mA		287	608A	*-/59.	4.2.6.5
エつと	ARM INPUT ARM INPUT (ADNE)	00	00		28V 28V 28V	608A 608A 608A	. 68	4.2.6.2
د ــ	(UNUSED) -	0	•		287	608A	.65/.65	4.2.6.3
ΣZ	(NONE) (UNUSED)	0	0		284	42.54 608A	s9·/s9·	4.2.6.3
٥	PAL MONITOR	287	48mA		115VAC 28V	451A 608A	.65/.65	4.2.6.1
œ	ARM INDICATION	28V	48mA		115VAC 28V	451A 608A	*-/89.	4.2.6.5
УН	SWITCHED TO GROUND (NONE)	0	0		115VAC · 28V	198m A 608A	.6s	4.2.6.6
> :	1		•				-	1
> 3	PYLON CONTINUITY	D 6	0 C	<u>-</u> -	28 4	608A	S	4.2.6.6
×	WPN DROP CONFIG. RETARD	0	0		78X	608A	. s	4.2.6.2
> 1	(FUTURE CAPABILITY)		0		28V	608A	.65	4.2.6.2
7	SURST OPTION-AIR	0 200	0 9		287	608A	.6s	4.2.6.2
. .	SAFE PROVISION	787 787	48m A		78A 78A	608A	.6s/-*	4.2.6.4
שט	(SRAM ONLY) WPN DROP CONFIG. FREE		00		115VAC 28V 28V	198m A 608A 608 A	. 6s	4.2.6.3
• •-	(FULURE CAPABILITY) BURST OPTION-GND	00			28V 28V	608A 608A	s 9.	4.2.6.2
	•	•		•				-

TABLE 1.2-1 Power and Load Analysis Results - FB-111/Station 3 (Sheet 3 of 4)

TABLE 1.2-1 Power and Load Analysis Results - FB-111/Station -R Weapon Interface (Sheet 4 of 4)

!	١.,	1 1				•		D2-	11857	6 -1									
	ANALYSIS PACKAGE	Section 4.2.6		4.2.6.2	4.2.6.5		4.2.6.5	4.2.6.2	4.2.6.3	4.2.6.3	4.2.6.3	4.2.6.6		4.2.6.2	4.2.6.2	2.6.	4.2.6.	4.2.6.3	4.2.6.2
RESULTS	WORST CASE	t		. 6s	.6s		.6s indefinite	.6s .6s	. 65	. 89.	. 68 . 68	indetinite .6s		9.	\$ 9. S	. 6s	.6s indefinite	. 6s 89.	.6s .6s
ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS	•	1		1333A 3286A	1333A 108mA		1333A 198mA	1333A 1333A	1333A 2154	1333A	1333A 1333A	1333A		1333A	1333A	1333A	1333A 198m A	1333A 1333A	1333A 1333A
ENV IRONMENT	ABNORMAL	٨		28V 115VAC	28V		28V 115VAC	28V 28V	28V 115V&C	287	28V 28V 28V	115VAC 28V		287	788 788 788	287	28V 115VAC	28V 28V	28V 28V
	NORMAL	ţ		. 6s	ł		;	::	. :	i	11	;		i	: :	ł	;	; ;	11
		1		1333A	48mA		48mA	00	• .		48mA 48mA	_0		0	00	0	o	00	00
		٨		287	287	į	287	00		0	28V 28V	0		•	00	0	0		00
7000	INTERFACE	FUNCTION	RH WPNS BAY	SAFE INPUT	(NONE) SAFE INDICATION	•	WPN PRESENT (GND)	ARM INPUT	(NONE) (UNUSED)	(NONE) (UNUSED)	PAL MONITOR ARM INDICATION	SWITCHED TO GND (NONE)	(NONE) (UNUSED IN WPN BAY) (UNUSED IN WPN BAY)	WPN DROP CONFIG. RET	(FUTURE CAPABILITY) RIRST OPTION-AIR	(SRAM ONLY)	SAFE PROVISION	(SRAM ONLY) WPN DROP CONFIG-FF	(FUTURE CAPABILITY) BURST OPTION - GND
		DESIGNATOR	J479013-R	Pin A	ထပ	<u>۵</u> ພ س			メコ	ΣZ	a. œ	۷۲	>>	:×:	- ^	, ris	۵	υ·σ) 0 %-

1.3 CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions were reached:

- The probability of abnormal voltage/currents being supplied to nuclear weapon interfaces, is considered to be very low, even in fire or crash environment, except as shown in this report.
- The reported sneak circuits are the only ones to exist in the nuclear weapons monitor, control and release systems, based on available data.
- o Sneak circuit analysis provides an excellent baseline for fault analysis while defining all normal environment paths.
- Wire-to-wire short circuits within common cables and crushed components can be expected in a crash causing abnormal continuities.
- o Limiting the scope of aircraft wiring harness fault analysis to wires within shared cables or connectors is considered practical and valid.
- o Techniques used in this study provide a number of fringe benefits:
 - Design concerns identified.
 - Input documentation accuracy cross checked.
 - Good visibility of interfacing circuits.
 - System configuration defined for all nuclear weapons monitor, control and release circuits.
 - Electrical safety of these circuits examined.

1.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Boeing recommends that AFWL/SEC

- o Continue with methods used for this analysis on other systems to be analyzed.
- o Provide access to input data as early as possible through cognizant ALC's.
- o Review findings from analysis to assess impact on weapon circuits.

2.0 ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION

This section describes the scope of the analysis, defines the tasks performed, and discusses the methods used.

2.1 SCOPE

The sneak circuit analyses performed on the B-52G and FB-111A aircraft were confined to circuitry pertaining to monitor, control and release of onboard nuclear weapons. The power and load analysis was confined to circuits which interface with the nuclear weapons and adjacent circuitry. Primary power, switched secondary power and control circuits were included as required.

Generalized aircraft damage modes and conditions under which they occur were studied to postulate circuit faults that could cause abnormal voltages and currents in wiring that interfaces with the nuclear weapon systems. For this analysis two operational modes were assumed: 1) Ground alert posture with power on and engines running, 2) flight (including taxi, takeoff and landing).

Sources that could possibly supply high voltage and current to wiring adjacent to direct nuclear weapon circuits were located and identified. Calculations were performed to determine voltage and current for each aircraft nuclear weapon system circuit at its interface with the weapon under both normal and faulted conditions. For these calculations each circuit was assumed grounded at the interface connector.

2.1.1 <u>Configuration</u>

The airplane configurations analyzed are as follows:

2.1.1.1 B-52G, Serial Number 59-2602, configured as follows:

Forward Bomb Bay - Multiple Weapon Clip-In Assembly, Type MHU-20A/C containing four bombs

Aft Bomb Bay - AGM-69A Launcher containing only Missile no. 1 Left Pylon - AGM-69A Ejector containing only Missile no. 1 Right Pylon - Identical to Left Pylon

2.1.1.2 FB-111A, Serial Number 69-6514, configured as follows:

Weapons Bay - Right-hand (Station -R) MAU-12B/A, Aircraft Bomb Ejector Rack Assemblies, each containing a bomb. (Left-hand station identical)

Left Pivot Pylon - Station -3, One MAU-12B/A, Aircraft Bomb Ejector Rack Assembly, containing a bomb.

Right Pivot Plyon - Identical to Left Pivot Pylon Station.

2.1.1.3 Analysis Assumptions and Exclusions

- O Interfaces with gravity bombs are the connectors shown in the aircraft wiring diagrams.
- o Interfaces with SRAMs are the connectors to the SRAM missile Internal SRAM missile circuits were excluded.
- Aircraft circuits for SRAM guidance were excluded.
- o One SRAM weapons bay installation and one SRAM pylon station was analyzed in depth for the B-52G. The other similar SRAM installations were analyzed for impacts of detail differences.
- o Analyses of abnormal environments considered only one fault at
- Wiring faults within aircraft wiring harnesses were limited to those within shared cables and connectors. Cable-to-cable and bundle-to-bundle wiring faults were excluded.
- o Release circuits were not included as nuclear weapon interface circuits during load analysis for abnormal environments.
- o Short circuits in terminals and faults internal to components were not considered except in the worst-case abnormal environment analysis for each model.
- o The abnormal environments analysis of the FB-111A escape capsule disconnects were limited to circuits related to nuclear weapons.
- o Circuits to the "Hound Dog" AGM were excluded.
- o FB-111A SRAM interfaces were excluded.

2.1.2 <u>Definitions</u>

Some terms used in this study require specific definitions for clarity. The following definitions apply throughout this report:

Normal environments

These are the conditions present on an aircraft during ground alert operations with no faults postulated due to component damage, or abnormal temperature, forces, radiation or other out-of-tolerance influences from the aircraft surroundings.

Abnormal environments

For the purposes of the analysis, the abnormal environments that were considered were damaging temperatures and mechanical forces due to fuel-fed fire for aircraft on ground alert status and fuel-fed fire or crash for aircraft in flight.

Power and load analysis

This consisted of determining open circuit voltage and short circuit current on each weapon system interface wire under normal and faulted conditions.

Fire on ground alert

A fire fed by aircraft fuel such that damaging temperatures and forces reach the circuits of concern while power is still applied to them.

Fire and crash in flight

An intense fire in flight fed by fuel and slipstream. Inflight crash involves collision or structural breakup resulting in mechanical forces that cause damage and introduce abnormal current paths such as conductive structural debris in contact with circuits of concern.

2.1.2 (Continued)

High voltage and current

Any AC or DC voltage or current exceeding normal operating values, allowing for tolerances.

Electrical faults

These are the logical results from the damage modes. They are of the following types:

- 1. Open weapon system circuits in components and wiring.
- 2. Shorted wires in junction boxes, components, cables and connectors containing circuits that lead to nuclear weapon interfaces.

Damage

The physical result of fire or crash as defined above. Damage modes are generalized categories such as shear, rupture, collapse, melting, and perforation.

Worst-case conditions

Worst-case conditions assumed power on all systems, all engines running and fire on ground alert, or fire/crash in flight, as defined above.

Power profile

Plots of short circuit current versus time on each weapon system interface wire.

Interfacing circuits

Any circuit that can directly affect nuclear circuits.

Adjacent wiring

Wires that physically share the same cable or connector but do not electrically interface with the nuclear weapon system circuits.

2.1.2 (Continued)

Transient suppression

Components/circuits that will reduce voltages from inductive loads such as relays, motors or solenoids.

Direct nuclear circuit

Any circuit that has a current path into the nuclear weapon interface without an interrupting device. Resistors and relay coils are assumed to continue the current path. Switches, circuit breakers and relay contacts stop the current path.

2.2 TASK DESCRIPTIONS

The following tasks were performed:

2.2.1 Data Requirements and Handling - Task 1

Boeing received, catalogued and filed documents such as wiring diagrams, schematics, wire lists and other input data that defined electrical continuity, operation, and subsystem functions to be analyzed by aircraft model. Appendix A lists technical data utilized for the analysis.

2.2.2 Electrical Paths and Network Trees - Task 2

Boeing processed the input data to identify all continuity paths. Network trees were prepared for the sneak circuit analysis and power/load analysis efforts described below.

2.2.3 Sneak Circuit Analysis - Task 3

Boeing performed a sneak circuit analysis of each aircraft model in the ground alert and flight modes assuming a normal environment. The analysis used the network trees developed in Task 2. Boeing identified potential sneak circuit conditions such as:

- o Sneak paths which may allow current or voltage to flow along an unexpected route to a nuclear weapon or SRAM interface.
- o Sneak timing which may actuate or inhibit a function at an unexpected time.

2.2.3 (Continued)

- o Sneak indications which may cause an ambiguous or false display of system operating conditions to the flight crew.
- o Sneak labels which may cause incorrect stimuli to be initiated by the flight crew.

2.2.4 Power and Load Analysis - Task 4

Boeing performed a power and load analysis under worst-case environment conditions with the aircraft on ground alert. This assumed that power is on all circuits of concern and that all engines are running. Boeing calculated maximum power duration and profile in direct and interfacing circuits and in wiring adjacent to exposed nuclear weapon system circuits. Maximum currents were calculated for each circuit path assuming zero impedance to ground at the weapon interface. Sources were identified that could possibly supply high voltage or current on wiring that interface with nuclear weapon circuits. Expected failure modes resulting from abnormal environments (fire) were considered in this task to the extent that they could affect the voltage and current available to the weapons. Abnormal environment was limited to fire for ground alert and fire or crash for flight mode.

2.2.5 <u>Documentation - Task 5</u>

Boeing documented the analyses as described below.

2.2.5.1 Potential Sneak Circuit Conditions

Sneak circuit conditions found were described and documented. Sketches of the circuits are included when appropriate. Recommendations for appropriate corrective action are given along with references to supporting documentation.

2.2.5.2 Undesirable Circuit Conditions

Undesirable circuit conditions found during the analysis are described on design concern reports. Circuit paths that could deliver high power to nuclear weapon interfaces as a result of fire and crash environments are identified in Circuit Analysis Packages. During the performance of the analysis,

2.2.5.2 (Continued)

when the following conditions were apparent, they were also described and reported on Design Concern Reports:

- o Single failure points
- o Unnecessary circuitry or components
- o Improper implementation of redundancy
- Lack of transient suppression or improper suppression for inductive loads
- o Improper application of components

2.2.5.3 Drawing Errors

Drawing errors and other discrepancies found in the input data for the analysis were identified and documented.

2.2.5.4 Analysis Effort Summary

The analysis effort was summarized to include: the Scope, Method, Conclusions and Recommendations at the completion of the analysis tasks.

2.3 METHODS

The chart in Figure 2.3-1 shows graphically how the total analysis was performed and the interaction between the sneak circuit portion and the power and loads analysis. The following paragraphs describe in detail how each analysis was performed.

2.3.1 Sneak Circuit Analysis Methods

The Sneak Circuit Analysis (SCA) techniques and associated computer programs developed by The Boeing Aerospace Company were designed to be applied to a broad range of electrical/electronic systems including the B-52G and FB-111A special weapons monitor, control and release systems. The methods described were applied directly.

Specifically, the methods used to conduct the analysis of these systems included an input phase, a processing phase and an analysis phase. Figure 2.3-2




Figure 2.3-1 "B-52/FB-111 ANALYSIS WORK FLOW"

2.3.1 (Continued)

shows the steps involved in these phases and their relationship.

2.3.1.1 Input Phase

Data supplied by the Air Force Weapons Laboratory were converted into the proper format for use by the computer. Input data was manually encoded from the detail schematics and wiring diagrams. The computer generated a masterfile from this data. Several automatic audit and edit functions were performed while generating the masterfiles. The masterfiles were then verified by a second analyst. The masterfile was updated as necessary to correct any discrepancies noted. By using manufacturing level data and performing necessary audit and edit functions, an accurate data base was insured. Drawing errors discovered have been reported.

2.3.1.2 Computer Processing Phase

The masterfiles generated in the input phase formed the data base for the path search program. One of the outputs of the run was the Open End (O.E.) Report. This report identified all the path segments that are not connected to another segment, power or ground. All unintentional open ends were resolved and the masterfiles updated. The O.E. Report is one method of discovering drawing errors, i.e., mismatched connector numbers, connector pin numbers, etc.

The next major step was the path search which established all possible paths by stringing together all records with point to point continuity. All data input to the search program was accounted for in the Used and Unused Data Record indices. Matrix reports were generated identifying all paths, intersect nodes and path types. Several other reports (terminal branch, switch branch, special node cross reference, etc.) were produced at this time to present supplementary information used during the analysis phase.

2.3.1.3 Analysis Phase

The outputs of the computer processing phase were collated into nodal set




Figure 2.3-2. Sneak Circuit Analysis Work Flow


2.3.1.3 (Continued)

packages. These packages contained the network trees, matrix reports and the various reference reports peculiar to each nodal set. The analyst then prepared "node topographs" for the network trees. Topological network trees show the electrical power source (voltage input) at the top and the electrical return (ground) at the bottom of the figure. The only exception to this was a network tree with digital logic in which case the tree was drawn in a left to right manner. All nodes (intersection of three or more branches) were structured into levels between power and ground, and they were separated into levels or from one another by branches containing a switching device, a load (impedance), or a diode.

The use of topological network trees is a feature which greatly facilitates the analysis by clearly showing all connections at each electrical node. It also eliminates extraneous circuit routing detail and drafting line layout problems which can handicap an analysis to the extent of hiding sneak circuits. Therefore, topological network trees were essential to successful electrical Sneak Circuit Analysis.

Another key element in electrical Sneak Circuit Analysis development came with realization that the clues can be divided into groups with each group applying to an individual node topograph. Node topographs are the patterns which geometrically describe node connections in topological network trees. The node topographs recognized to exist in electrical network topology are presented in Figure 2.3-3. All electrical nodes in a topological network tree will fit one of these patterns. More complex patterns encountered can be broken into component parts represented by these basic patterns. The actual analysis was then performed by identifying all possible modes of operation, eliminating those that are not possible by switching or other restrictions and then determining if the remaining circuits perform as intended by the designer. The analyst applied a list of approximately forty "sneak circuit clues" to each nodal set. Potential "sneak" conditions and design concerns were reported along with the recommended corrective action.

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2.3.2 Power and Load Analysis Method

The power and load analysis was performed for both normal and abnormal environment conditions.

2.3.2.1 Definition of Environments and Fault Modes

The power and load analysis involved normal and abnormal environments for nuclear-loaded ground alert and operational flight postures. Boeing defined the environments as shown in Table 2.3-1. There is very little difference in electrical effects between flight and ground alert. Perhaps the basic difference is ambient temperature which has a significant effect upon circuit breaker trip times.

TABLE 2.3-1 ENVIRONMENTS AND FAULT MODES

OPERATIONAL		ENVIRORMENT DEFINITION	FEASIBLE
POSTURE	ENVIRONMENT	CONDITIONS	FAULT MODES
GROUND ALERT	NORMAL	o AIRCRAFT PARKED o ALL ENGINES RUNNING o POMER ON ALL BUSSES o AMBIENT T = 25°C	NONE
	ABNORMAL	O AIRCRAFT PARKED O ALL ENGINES RUNNING O POWER ON ALL BUSSES O POWER ON ALL CIRCUITS OF CONCEPN O FIRE LOCATED IN AREA OF CONCERN D AMBIENT T = 25°C	O ADJACENT WIRES/ADJACENT PINS SHORTED TOGETHER O WIRES IN COTTON CABLE FAULTED OPEN/ OR SHORTED TO GROUND COMPONENTS/EQUIPMENT SHORTED TOGETHER OR TO GROUND O POWER LOSS FROM FAULTED COMPONENT
FLIGHT	NORMAL	O AIRCRAFT FLYING NORMAL MISSION PROFILE O ALL ENGINES, GENERATORS, TR'S, BATTERIES OPERATING O POWER ON ALL BUSSES O AMBIENT T = -54 C O CREW COMPARTMENT T = 25°C	:AONE
	ABNORMAL	O ALL ENGINES RUNNING O POWER ON ALL BUSSES AND CIRCUITS OF CONCERN CRASH DAMAGE IN AREA OF CONCERN FIRE IN AREA OF CONCERN AMBIENT T = -54°C	ADJACENT WIRES/ADJACENT PINS SHORTED TOGETHER WIRES IN COMMON CABLE FAULTED OPEN/ OR SHORTED TO GROUND COMPONENTS/EQUIPMENT SHORTED TOGETHER OR TO GROUND POWER LOSS FROM FAULTED COMPONENT

2.3.2.2 Normal Condition Calculations

The network trees that show the weapon interfaces and interfacing circuitry were analyzed as to voltage sources and current paths to the weapon interface. Path resistance was determined from the voltage source to the weapon interface where current paths were determined to be possible under ground alert or normal inflight checkout. This resistance was obtained from cable assembly drawings, wiring specifications, aircraft dimensions and cable routing. It was assumed for this analysis that arming functions and code switching were not normal conditions, but monitor, station select and safing functions might be performed. The current profile was then determined from the voltage source and path resistance assuming a ground at the weapon interface. Open circuit voltage was determined to be the source voltage assuming an open circuit at the weapon interface.

2.3.2.3 Fault Condition Calculations

The network trees that show the weapon interfaces and interfacing circuitry were analyzed as to possible voltage sources under fault conditions. The computer generated path reports were used to determine each connection and wire segment in the direct and interfacing circuitry. These were used with the computer generated output data index, technical orders, wiring diagrams, schematics and cable assembly drawings to determine powered circuitry in common cables, connectors or component assemblies. Under fault conditions it was assumed that any powered circuits could short into the direct or connected interfacing circuits where they exist in common cables, connectors or component assemblies. A sketch was prepared for each weapon interface pin to show the direct circuitry and adjacent circuitry. Potential points where faults could occur were identified on the sketches and on the network trees. The worst case path for each weapon interface was determined from examination of the above data considering the power source voltage wire lengths and wire sizes. Resistance of the faulted path was determined from the cable assembly drawings, wiring specifications, aircraft dimensions and cable routing. The worst case path for each weapon interface was shown on a sketch that identifies

2.3.2.3 (Continued)

the fault area, resistance of the path and the voltage source. Maximum current was calculated assuming a ground at the weapon interface. Open circuit voltage was determined assuming an open circuit at the weapon interface. Time duration of the current was determined using manufacturer's data and governing specifications of the circuit breakers that supplied the circuits.

3.0 SNEAK CIRCUIT ANALYSIS OF B-52G & FB-111A

A Sneak Circuit Analysis of the Monitor & Control and Weapons Release systems of the B-52G and FB-111A aircraft was performed with the aid of a digital computer.

3.1 SUMMARY

The analyses of the systems of each aircraft were based on electrical wiring data from technical manuals. Circuit evaluation was limited to pertinent portions of the subsystems, and excluded circuitry internal to the weapons. The results of the B-52G analysis were three sneak-circuit reports describing erroneous indicator lights, two design concern reports describing unnecessary components and a single failure point, and one drawing error report. The FB-111A analysis resulted in two sneak circuit reports describing a sneak inhibit and a bus-to-bus tie, and five drawing error reports. Copies of all reports are included in Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 respectively.

3.2 CONDITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The B-52G and FB-111A sneak circuit analyses were based on electrical wiring diagrams contained in technical manuals. The information shown on these drawings was of sufficient detail for component interconnections and generally sufficient for circuits internal to component "Boxes". Supplementary information was obtained from functional/integrated drawings and system descriptions from additional technical manuals.

Specifically, the circuitry of each aircraft that was analyzed was limited to the portions of the Weapons Release and Monitor and Control Systems for which electrical wiring data was available. Circuitry in other systems which interfaced with the aforementioned systems was considered out of scope. No circuitry internal to the gravity weapons or the AGM-69A was included in the analysis. Assumptions were made for components on which detail electrical data were not available, based on the supplementary information.

3.3 NETWORK TREES

The network trees derived from computer processed B-52G and FB-111A data were analyzed for sneak circuit conditions. The trees were uniquely identified according to aircraft, numbered, and titled for reference and cross-reference between trees. Copies of all network trees for B-52G and FB-111A aircraft are included as Volumes 2 and 3.

3.4 SNEAK CIRCUIT REPORTS

Five sneak circuit conditions were discovered during the analysis of aircraft systems. Three sneak circuit reports (SCR's) resulted from B-52G analysis, and two SCR's from FB-111A analysis. Copies of these SCR's are presented in the Figures listed below.

SCR Number	Subject	<u>Figure</u>
B-52G-1	DCU-9/A Warning Light	3.4-1
-2	Master Bomb Control Power Indicator	3.4-2
-3	AGM-69A Power Distribution Indicator	3.4-3
FB-111A-1	Tail Arming Solenoid	3.4-4
-2	Essential Bus to Main Bus Tie	3.4-5

SNEAK CIRCUIT REPORT

TITLE DCU-9/A Warning Light Provides False Indication.

DATE __8-27-75 M. Garnett ENGINEER

REFERENCES

- 1) USAF T.O. 11N-T5009-2 change 6, para. 4-1.2 Warning Indicator 2) USAF T.O. 18-528-2-31 change 32, page 3-83, figure 3-20
- 3) USAF T.O. 1B-52B-2-23, A8F.00 Rev JH
- 4) USAF T.O. 1B-52B-2-23, A8.14 Rev KM

MODULE/EQUIPMENT .

DCU-9/A/B52-G

EXPLANATION

Per reference 1, the DCU-9/A Warning Indicator is used to indicate undesirable external conditions or to test certain external circuits for continuity. When the forward readiness switch S619 is in the SAFE position and the DCU-9/A rotary switch is in the GND or AIR position, relay K502 in the readiness panel will energize removing Jll, J12, J13, and J14 pins G and L from the warning indicator circuit by opening the normally closed K502 contacts. Closure of the normally open K502 contacts will illuminate the warning indicator falsely implying an undesirable external circuit condition even though the indicator is not connected to an external circuit. Power is still present on J11/A through J14/A to "safe" the weapon. See figure 1.

POTENTIAL IMPACT

False indication of an undesirable external condition when an undesirable internal condition exists.

RECOMMENDATION

Change reference 1 and other documentation as necessary to show that the DCU-9/A warning light may also indicate an undesired switch configuration in addition to undesired external circuit conditions.

Figure 3.4.1, Page 1

THE BITERIAL ACRESTACE COMPANY - HOUSTON, TEXAS




Figure 3.4.1, Page 2

SNEAK CIRCUIT REPORT B-52G-2

TITLE Erroneous Master Bomb Control Power
On Indicator

DATE 8-27-75

ENGINEER L. Bose

jk. Andrewsky and the second seco

REFERENCES

- 1) T.O. 1B-52G-2-23, change 16, Electronic Wiring Diagrams and Data, Diagrams A6.02, A4.38, A3.32.
- 2) T.O. 1B-52G-2-31, change 38, Bomb Release Systems, pages 2-1, 2-3 & 3-1.

MODULE/EQUIPMENT

B-52G/A234

EXPLANATION

Figure 1 shows DS155, the "Power On" indicator in A234, Master Bomb Control Panel. This indicator is supplied power through CB411 (A174), S302 (A234) and S151 (A234), the Master Bomb Control Power On/Off switch. This indication shows only that power from CB411 and S302 has been switched through S151. It does not accurately indicate that the Master Bomb Control Power On function has been accomplished through S151 switching. Three other wafers of S151 switch control power from CB284 and CB409. The present configuration of DS155 cannot monitor that control power from CB284 and CB409 has been switched through S151.

POTENTIAL IMPACT

DS155 could provide indication that power is on when it may be partially or totally interrupted by CB284 or CB409.

RECOMMENDATION

Change all applicable documentation to show that DS155 may not indicate power on function.

Figure 3.4.2, Page 1

THE BUETNE AFRESPACE COMPANY - HOUSTON, TEXAS




Figure 3.4.2, Page 2

SNEAK CIRCUIT REPORT B-52G-3

TITLE Erroneous Indicator In AGM-69A
Power Distribution

REFERENCES

- 1) T.O. 1B-52G-2-23, change 16, Electronic Wiring Diagrams and Data, pages Y6B1M.03 & Y6B1U.04.
- 2) T.O. 1B-52G-2-12, change 55, Electrical Systems, pages 3-51, 3-52, 3-53, & 3-54.

MODULE/EQUIPMENT

B52-G/AGM-69A PWR DIST. BOX

EXPLANATION

Indicator DS439 in A482, AGM-69A Power Distribution Box, does not indicate "Hydraulic Pump T. R. On" as its label suggests. DS439 shows only that K659 the Hydraulic Pump T. R. Ground Check Relay has been energized. A true "T.R. On" can be taken only at the output of the transformer-rectifier (T.R.). DS439 and the transformer-rectifier input circuits are shown in Figure 1.

POTENTIAL IMPACT:

The present configuration of DS439 cannot monitor loss of input or output of the transformer-rectifier.

RECOMMENDATION

- 1. Incorporate into applicable documentation that DS439 may not indicate the true "on-off" status of the hydraulic pumn T.K., or
- 2. If a true "on" indication is desired, place DS439 or control of DS439 in the transformer-rectifier output circuit.

Figure 3.4.3, Page 1

THE BUEINE AERCSPACE COMPANY - HOUSTON, TEXAS




Figure 3.4.3, Page 2

SNEAK CIRCUIT REPORT FB-111A-1

TITLE Tail Arming Solenoid Cannot be Energized

DATE 9-17-75

ENGINEER M. Garnett

REFERENCES

- 1. T.O. 11N-T5055-2, Change 6, Station Program Unit, Figure 3-4.
- 2. T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1, Change 2, Figure 1-8, pg. 1-22

MODULE/EQUIPMENT

Pivot Pylon Conventional Station Program Unit/FB-111A

EXPLANATION

Reference 1 is excerpted in Figure 1. Note that no connection is made to pin 13 of relay K9. Normally open contact 3 of K9 connects to the "TAIL ARMING SOLENOID". Because of no connection to K9 pin 13, no means exists to energize the solenoid.

POTENTIAL IMPACT

Impossibility of tail arming a conventional weapon in this configuration.

RECOMMENDATION

Reference 2 implies that the dotted line connection shown in Figure 1 would resolve the problem. \hat{r}

Figure 3.4.4, Page 1

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


Figure 3.4.4, Page 2

SNEAK CIRCUIT REPORT FB-111A-2 PAGE 1 OF 2

TITLE ESSENTIAL BUS TO MAIN BUS TIE

DATE 10-6-75
ENGINEER # Holf
H. Holt

REFERENCES

- 1. T.O. 11F9-2-3 Technical Manual, Overhaul Instructions, Programmer Electronic Command Signals, Figure 12-1.
- 2. T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14 Technical Manual, Organizational Maintenance, Wiring Diagrams, Figure 3-28A & 3-41A.
- 3. T.O. 11N-T5055-2 Technical Manual Intermediate Maintenance, Station Program Unit Figure 3-4.

MODULE/EQUIPMENT

Weapon Release Circuitry/FB-111A

EXPLANATION

Figure 1 shows that when the Release Program Unit (RPU) issues a MAU Fire 2 command and K3 (Stores Jett) in the conventional SPU is energized a bus to bus tie exists between the 28VDC Ess bus in the DC Power Panel and the 28VDC Main bus in Weapons Bay DC Power Panel. This is typical for all four pylon weapons stations.

POTENTIAL IMPACT


When the bus to bus tie is made the 28VDC Ess bus can supply power to the 28VDC Main bus loads if the 28VDC Main bus is not powered for any reason. If the 28VDC Ess bus is at a higher potential than the 28VDC Nain bus, CB5 in the DC Power Panel could trip causing loss of 28VDC power to the RPU MAU Fire circuits. Any fault that trips CB5 in the DC Power Panel will cause loss of both MAU Fire and 2 commands to all pivot pylons.

RECOMMENDATION

Revise the aircraft wiring such that RPU connector J230004 pin 2 is supplied power from the 28VDC Main bus and remove the internal connection in the RPU that ties the wiring from J230004 pins 1 and 2 together, and reverse MAU Fire 1 and 2 outputs for weapon station 3 at the RPU.

Figure 3.4-5, Page 1

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3.5 DESIGN CONCERN REPORTS

Two design concern reports (DCR's) were written describing areas of concern in B-52G circuitry. No DCR's resulted from the FB-111A analysis. Copies of the two DCR's are presented in Figures listed below.

DCR Number	Subject	<u>Figure</u>
B-52G-1	Unnecessary Components	3.5-1
-2	Single Failure Point	3.5-2

DESIGN CONCERN REPORT B-52G-1

TITLE Unnecessary Components in Clip-In Subassembly and MB 3A Bomb Racks

DATE 9-2-75

ENGINEER M. Garnett

.k.,

REFERENCES

1) USAF T.O. 11N-H5035-2, change 4, page 5-2, figure 5-1.

MODULE/EQUIPMENT

Clip-In Subassembly/B52-G

EXPLANATION

Figure 1 shows the forward right release schematic as it presently exists. Note that regardless of the state of salvo control relay Kl, the lower and upper right release solenoids will energize with the BRML switches closed. A less complex circuit shown in figure 2 deletes Kl, uses a single set of lower right BRML switch contacts, a single pair of lower right BOMB RACK RELEASE solenoid contacts, a single set of upper right BRML switch contacts, and a single pair of upper right BOMB RACK RELEASE solenoid contacts. A similar situation exists for the forward left release schematic.

RECOMMENDATION

The configuration shown in figure 2 requires fewer and less complex components. Removal of the salvo control relay Kl saves parts and improves reliability. It may be desired however, to leave the BRML switches and RELEASE solenoid contacts as is for redundancy.

Figure 3.5.1, Page 1

THE BUEFFE AFROSPACE COMPANY - HOUSTON, TEXAS

AV-4225-1




Figure 3.5.1, Page 2




Figure 3.5.1, Page 3

DESIGN CONCERN REPORT B-52G-2

TITLE Single Failure Point Ties Missile Critical & Non-Critical Electronic Power

DATE 9-3-75
ENGINEER M. Garnett

REFERENCES

1) USAF T.O. 11LA12-2-3, page 5-40, figure 5-9, Schematic Diagram Relay Assembly 2) USAF T.O. 16W6-19-2, change 3, page 5-15, figure 5-7, Pylon Electrical Schematic

MODULE/EQUIPMENT

B-52G/AGM-69A

EXPLANATION

As shown in figure 1, pins Y and M on the missile connector (J9 for MSL 1, etc) are connected together in the relay assembly, reference 1. This connection ties the "ELECTRONIC POWER (NON-CRITICAL)" and the "ELECTRONIC POWER (CRITICAL)" supplied to the missiles per reference 2. A failure on the "NON-CRITICAL" bus will result in the loss of both "CRITICAL" and "NON-CRITICAL" ELECTRONIC POWER.

RECOMMENDATION

Supply separate paths including circuit breakers and relay switching for "CRITICAL" and "NON-CRITICAL" ELECTRONIC POWER or delete the distinction.

Figure 3.5.2, Page 1

THE BUEFFUE AFROSPACE COMPANY - HOUSTON, TEXAS

AV-4725-1




Figure 3.5.2, Page 2

3.6 DRAWING ERROR REPORTS

A total of six drawing error reports (DER's) were written during the analysis. One DER resulted from the B-52G analysis, and five resulted from the FB-111A analysis. Copies of the DER's are presented in Figures listed below.

DER Number	Subject	<u>Figure</u>
B-52G-1	T.O. 1B-52G-2-23, p. A8.14, Change 10	3.6-1
FB-111A-1	T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14, p. 3-246H,	
	Change 5	3.6-2
-2	T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-145-1, p. 3-244,	3.6-3
	Change 5	
-3	T.O. 1F-111(B) A-214, p. 3-246 E,	
	Change 5-S10	3.6-4
-4	T.O. 16W6-23-2, p. 2-69, Change 9	3.6-5
-5	T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14, p. 3-762A,	
	Change 10	3.6-6

DRAWING ERROR REPORT B-52G-1

10:	PROJECT:	
DCUMENT NO.	REFERENCE DESIGNATOR	SUBSYSTEM
T.O. 1B-52G-2-23, A8.14 Change 10	A217	POWER
UNIT NOMENCLATURE		
LH FWD DC LOAD BOX		<u> </u>
DISCREPANCY:	•	
CB550 has a rating of 5A shown on page shown in the index is BAC-Cl8J-15 which	A8.14 of T.O. 18-52G-2-23. T	he part number
Shown in the index is pac-cled-is willen	is a 15% racing.	
	•	•
		•
ASSUMED CORRECTION:		,
Change the rating shown on page A8.14 t	o 15A.	
		•
	•	
		•
REPORTED BY J. B. Campbell	DATE 8-19-75	
SNEAK CIRCUIT GROUP ACTION BY J. B. Campbell Jlc.	DATE 8-19-75	
Jacob Action 81	UNIT	····
	.	
CONTACT NAME	DATE	
CONTRACTOR CONCURRENCE BY	DATE	
Figure 3.	6.1	
_		
1001-227 SPACE DIVISION	HOUSTON	

3-20

DRAWING ERROR REPORT FB-111A-1

TO:	PROJECT: FB-111A	
DOCUMENT NO.	REFERENCE DESIGNATOR	SUBSYSTEM
T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14	RPU (A2)	
UNIT NOMENCLATURE		
RELEASE PROGRAM UNIT		
DISCREPANCY:		
Figure 3-28A, Sheet 9; Page 3-246H, Ch	ange 5	·
The following discrepancies exist in t attached sheet:	hat portion of the circuit s	shown on the
 Plug Pl3 is labeled incorrectly Receptacle J23004 is labeled incor The function of Pl3-2,3,4 are show Wire number A2403Bl2 is used twice 	n incorrectly	
ASSUMED CORRECTION:		·
 P13 will be labeled P230004. The RPU receptacle will be labeled All inputs to the RPU will be labe One wire will be renumbered. 		
REPORTED BY P. Stokes + Stores	DATE	-75
SNEAK CIRCUIT GROUP ACTION BY Julius B. Complet	DATE 9-2	3 - 75
CONTACT NAME	DATE	
CONTRACTOR CONCURRENCE BY	DATE	
		•
• I		
Figure	3.6.2, Page 1	1

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SPACE DIVISION HOUSTON




Figure 3.6.2, Page 2

DRAWING ERROR REPORT FB-111A-2

TO:	PROJECT: FB-111A	
DOCUMENT NO.	REFERENCE DESIGNATOR	SUBSYSTEM
USAF T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-145-1, Change	5 SPU L and R	
UNIT NOMENCLATURE		
Station Program Unit, part number 934	6-8479-1	
DISCREPANCY:		
On Sheet 3-244, Figure 3-28 shows modu SPU's. Note that J479002/28 is refer J479002/28 can be located but J479002 is present. See Figure 1. It appear reversed.	enced to 12D2247. At this refe /41 (unwired on the document in	erence no n question)
ASSUMED CORRECTION:		
Using USAF T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1, sh J479002/28 should be unwired and J479 to 12D2247 in pin 28's place. Figure T.O.	002/41 should be shown connected	ed and referenced
	•	
		•
DEDODIED BY M. Garnett	DATE 9-23-75	:
REPORTED BY	DATE	
SNEAK CIRCUIT GROUP ACTION BY Julius B. Campbell	DATE 9-24-	75
CONTACT NAME	DATE	
CONTRACTOR CONCURRENCE BY	DATE	
CONTRACTOR CONCURRENCE BY	VAIC	
ļ		
	•	
į		
Figure	3.6.3, Page 1	

THE BUEING COMPANY SPACE DIVISION HOUSTON




Figure 3.6.3, Page 2 3-24

DRAWING ERROR REPORT FB-111A-3

10:	PROJECT: FB-111A	
DOCUMENT NO.	REFERENCE DESIGNATOR	SUBSYSTEM
T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14	003\$10	
UNIT NOMENCLATURE		
EXT STORES JETTISON		
DISCREPANCY:		
Figure 3-28A, Sheet 6, Page 3-246E, On the jettison panel, S10 is label (Ref. T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1, Chang	ed "EXT STORES JETTISON"	JETTISON SW".
ASSUMED CORRECTION:	•	•
Change figure 3-28A, Sheet 6 of T.O so that panel nomenclature and sche		- STORES JETTISON
REPORTED BY Jim Verges Q	DATE 9-24	-75
SNEAK CIRCUIT GROUP ACTION BY FRUIT Campbell	DATE	
CONTACT NAME	DATE	
CONTRACTOR CONCURRENCE BY	DATE	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Figure	3.6-4	
(00-17/		

BUEING COMPAN. SPACE DIVISION HOUSTO

SNEAK CIRCUIT DRAWING ERROR REPORT FB-111A-4

TO:	PROJECT:	
DOCUMENT NO.	REFERENCE DESIGNATOR	SUBSYSTEM Monitor &
T.O. 16W6-23-2, 2-69, Change 9	Pivot Pylon	Control
UNIT NOMENCLATURE		
Conventional Weapon Station Program (Unit	
DISCREPANCY: T.O. 16W6-23-2 shows an electrical connect P47900-1.	ction between Pins 1, 20, 21 c	of connector
T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14 and T.O. 1F-111(B)A-Pins 1, 20, 22 of connector P479001-1.	-2-11-1 show an electrical cor	nnection between
ASSUMED CORRECTION:	•	·
T.O. 16W6-23-2 should be changed to show of connector P479001-1.	electrical connection between	Pins 1, 20, 22
	·	
REPORTED BY H. Holt 2 Jul	DATE 10-3-7	'5
SNEAK CIRCUIT GROUP ACTION BY H. Holt 7/ Half	DATE	
CONTACT NAME	DATE	
CONTRACTOR CONCURRENCE BY	DATE	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Figure	3.6-5	

100-777-1

SNEAK CIRCUIT DRAWING ERROR REPORT FB-111A-5


TO:	PROJECT:	
DOCUMENT NO.	REFERENCE DESIGNATOR	SUBSYSTEM Weapon
T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14, Change 10	304A1	Release
unit nomènclature		:
Program Release B Circuit Breaker		
DISCREPANCY:		•
T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14, Page 3-762A, Chang breaker between wire A2403A12 and the es		e B circuit
T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14, Page 3-246H, Chang breaker between wire A2403A12 and the es	e 5 shows the Program Release sential bus rated at 20 amps.	B circuit
	•	
ASSUMED CORRECTION:	•	•
T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14, Page 3-762A should circuit breaker (between wire A2403A12 a	be changed to show the Progr nd essential bus) rated at 20	am Release B amps.
REPORTED BY H. Holt # 246/	DATE 10-3	-75
SNEAK CIRCUIT H. Holt 21. 14	DATE 10-3	-75
CONTACT NAME	DATE	
CONTRACTOR CONCURRENCE BY	DATE	
Figur	re 3.6-6	

RE BIBLEING COMPANY SPACE DIVISION HOUSTON

4.0 POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS

Boeing performed a power and load analysis of B-52 and FB-111 aircraft monitor and control (AMAC) circuitry to the nuclear weapon interfaces. Normal power and load analysis included direct and indirect interface circuits. Circuits adjacent to exposed nuclear weapon system circuitry sharing common cables, connectors and components were included in the fault analysis. The B-52 and FB-111 subsections are designed to stand alone in the event that they are separated from the rest of the report. The following diagram shows how the power and load analysis subsections are organized.

POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS SECTION 4



4.1 POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS - B-52G

This section describes the power and load analysis of the B-52G monitor and control (AMAC) circuits leading to gravity weapons loaded on the forward bomb bay multiple carriage clip-in assembly and to AGM-69A missiles on the left pylon and the launcher in the aft bomb bay. Figures 4.1-A and 4.1-B are simplified schematic diagrams of gravity weapon circuits and AGM-69A arming circuits. Numbers opposite the AMAC connector pins refer to analysis packages in Sections 4.1.6 and 4.1.7 of this report.

4.1.1 Summary

The power and load analysis was performed on groups of interface circuits identified by sneak circuit network trees. Results are summarized in Table 4.1-A.

4.1.2 Conditions

The study was made according to the following ground-ruled conditions:

- o Interfaces with gravity bombs are the connectors shown in the aircraft wiring diagrams.
- o Interfaces with SRAM are the aircraft connectors to the SRAM missile. Internal SRAM missile circuits were excluded.
- o Aircraft circuits for SRAM guidance were excluded.
- o One SRAM weapons bay installation and one SRAM pylon station was analyzed in depth for the B-52G. The other similar SRAM installations were analyzed for impacts of detail differences.
- o Analyses of abnormal environments considered only one fault at a time.
- o Wiring faults within aircraft wiring harnesses were limited to those within shared cables and connectors. Cable-to-cable and bundle-to-bundle wiring faults were excluded.
- o Release circuits were not included as nuclear weapon interface circuits during load analysis for abnormal environments.
- o Short circuits in terminals and faults internal to components were considered only in the worst-case abnormal environment analysis for each model.

Power and Load Analysis Results - B-52/6ravity Weapons Interface (Sheet 1 of 2) TABLE 4.1-A

LTS	SE ANALYSIS PACKAGE	t Section 4.1.6	•	.4s 4.1.6.7	s 	4.1.6	.8s 4.1.5.6 .2s 4.1.6.6 4.1.6.7	.8s 4.1.6.7	.8s 4.1.6.3 (LH WPNS) .8s 4.1.6.3 .8s 4.1.6.3 .8s 4.1.6.3 .1s 4.1.6.4 .1s 4.1.6.4 .2s 4.1.6.6 .8s 4.1.6.6
ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS	ABNORMAL - WORST CASE	I	otherwise noted. z unless otherwise noted.			I	17 150A 17 109A 1 17 152A	24V 258A 24V 152A	28V 1170A 28V 1000A 24V 800A 24V 152A 24V 110A 110A 110A 110A 152A 24V 152A 152A 152A
ENV I ROA		t	s unless of ts 400 Hz	3.5s 24V - 24V - 24V	1.0s			0.8s 2 ²	288 288 284 244 244 244 244
	NORMAL	VI	Note: Power is DC AC current	24V 75A 0			000	GROUND 24V 152A 0	GROUND GROUND O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
NO OPEN	MEAFON INTERFACE	FUNCTION	Forward Bomb Bay Clip- In Connectors	IFC SAFING PWR TESTER SW GND TESTER SW OFF/SAFF	S S S	SE E	TESTER SW, READY TESTER SW, AIR INFLIGHT TEST	GROUN SAFIN LIGHT	WPN GROUND FWD IFI PWR, 25A AFT IFI PWR, 25A WPN GROUND FWD IFI PWR, 15A (OPEN) FWD IFI PWR, 15A TESTER SW, GND TESTER SW, GND TESTER SW, GND TESTER SW, GND TESTER SW, READY
		DESIGNATOR	All4, Jll, Jl2, Jl2, and Jl4	Pin A B C		ند رح :	I 7 J	O C & (131,127 113,127 141,000 141,00

TABLE 4.1A Power and Load Analysis Results - B-52/AGM-69 Interfaces (Sheet 2 of 2)

	- NOGERA				ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS	ANALYSIS	RESULTS	
	INTERFACE		NORMAL		ABNORMAL	- WORS	WORST CASE	ANALYSIS PACKAGE
DESIGNATOR	FURCTION	>	1	43	٨	-	ţ	Section 4.1.7
31	Missile Connector				 			
Pin 2	BATTERY ACTIVATE PYLON LAUNCHER	86	00 0	1 1	118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s	4.1.7.4
01	ACCUMULATOR ACT. PYLON LAUNCHER	86	o o		118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s	4.1.7.4
	SAF CLASS III A CMD. PYLON LAUNCHER	86	88		118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s	4.1.7.8
5 2	FIN UNLOCK PYLON LAUNCHER	00	00 O	, ,	118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s	4.1.7.4
57	PROPULSION SAFE PYLON LAURCHER	86	88	• •	28V 28V	1115A 411A	1.5s 2.0s	4.1.7.5 4.1.7.3
09	SAF CLASS III B CMD. PYLON LAUNCHER	86	8 8	1 1	118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s	4.1.7.8
82, 92, 96	MISSILE ELECTRONIC POWER PYLON SYS. ON SYS. OFF LAUNCHER SYS. ON SYS. OFF	287 00 00 00	254A 0A 368A 0A	.45s	28V 28V 28V 28V	1115A 1115A 1220A 1220A	 3.5.5 8.5.5 8.5.5 8.5.5	4.1.7.6 4.1.7.6 4.1.7.2 4.1.7.2
26	SAF PREARM CMD. PYLON LAUNCHER	. 20	O O	1 1	118VAC 118VAC	983A 900A	.125s .13s	4.1.7.1
າເ	Ejector Connector	•						
Pin r	ARM SOLENOID PYLON LAUNCHER	86	88	1 1	27V 27V	37A 54A	5	4.1.7.7

4.1.3 <u>Identification of Circuits</u>

The analysis used Air Force technical manuals and other source documents to identify the interface circuits. The gravity bomb interfaces are shown in T.O. 11N-H5035-2, Figure 5-2, Change 4. (Reproduced in Figure 4.1-A of this report). The AMAC circuitry to the gravity weapons is shown in Figure 4.1-B, which is a reproduction of T.O. 1B-52B-2-31, Figure 3-10, Change 33. Analysis package numbers are shown opposite to the corresponding AMAC connector pins. AGM-69A missile interface is shown in Figure 4.1-C. Pertinent arming circuits are shown in Figure 4.1-D. The analysis used sneak circuit network trees and other source documents to identify adjacent and interrelated circuits for fault analysis. The applicable network trees are reproduced in the analysis packages.

4.1.4 Normal Environment


Power capability of the interfacing circuits was calculated by determining open circuit voltage and short circuit current at the weapon interfaces with the circuits grounded at that point.


4.1.5 Abnormal Environments

Each network tree was analyzed for postulated faults. Postulated faults were identified by numbered circles. The worst case for each interfacing circuit was identified and open circuit voltage, short circuit current and the duration of current flow was determined.

Several of the faults postulated receive power through the DCU-9/A Tester or SWK Box. Power from these sources can occur only twice during a mission according to T.O. 1B-52G-1, Radar Navigators Checklist (Nuclear), once during the Interior Inspection Checklist, before takeoff, and during the Before Descent Checklist. Power paths other than those through DCU-9/A Tester or SWK Box were used to determine worst case conditions whenever they existed. The reasons are that exposure to damage time during testing is minimal, and testing does not occur during landing, takeoff and air refueling when risk to damage is highest.

4-6.










Figure 4.1-C AGM-69A Missile Interface



4.1.5.1 Ground Rules & Assumptions

Wire resistances and resistances across switches and relays were selected from parts specifications. Zero ohms resistance was assumed for cable connections and splices. Circuit breaker trip-times were determined from Figure 4.1-E, B-52 Gravity Bomb Circuit Breaker Trip Time V⁻ Current Profile, and Figures 4.1-F, -G and -H, AGM-69A Circuit Breaker Trip Time Vs Current Profile. These curves were obtained from parts specifications. When applicable, standard temperature was used in determining characteristics.



CB TRIP TIME VS CURRENT PROFILE

Figure 4.1-E Gravity Bomb Circuit Breaker Trip Time Vs Maximum Current




Fig. 4.1-F AGM-69A Circuit Breaker Trip Time Vs Current -2, 5, 10 & 20 A Breakers





Fig. 4.1-G AGM-69A Circuit Breaker Trip Time Vs Current -7, 15, & 35 A Breakers




4.1.6 CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGES

Normal and fault analyses of each network tree are documented in individual packages. The following analysis packages cover all of the interface circuits to weapons carried in the forward bomb bay on the multiple carriage clip-in assembly:

4.1.6.1	Pin d	AMAC FWD SYS SECT III & IFC RELAY (Network Tree 0200)
4.1.6.2	Pin T	POWER FROM TR 4 (Network Tree 80)
4.1.6.3	Pins T, W & Y	POWER FROM TR 8 (Network Tree 83)
4.1.6.4	Pins C, f, Z & a	INFLIGHT CONTROL TESTER, DCU-9A (Network Tree 0198)
4.1.6.5	Pin h	FWD BOMB BAY SAFING (Network Tree 201, 248)
4.1.6.6	Pins <u>c</u> , J, H & F	INFLIGHT CONTROL TESTER, DCU-9A (Network Tree 0199)
4.1.6.7	Pins G. L, R, E,D,B,A & P	DCU-9A, INFLIGHT TEST (Network Tree 43B)
4.1.6.8	Pin X	UNUSED CIRCUITRY (Network Tree 202)

NOTE

<u>Power Profiles</u> - In all cases, short circuit current, caused by faults was found to be constant because of the absence of inductors and capacitors in the circuits investigated. Voltage source impedance was assumed to be zero ohms. A typical fault current Vs time profile is shown here:




FAULT CURRENT PROFILE

CLIP-IN ASSEMBLY PIN d CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.1.6.1 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pin <u>d</u> of Connectors J11, J12, J13 and J14 on the Al14 Clip-In Assembly and Cable In Forward Bomb Bay

These interfaces are shown in Figure 5-2, T.O. 11N-H5035-2 (Change 4) - copy attached below. Maximum current available to pin \underline{d} in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$ amps. Worst case current at 24VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be $\underline{152}$ amps assuming the pin \underline{d} wires grounded at the weapon and shorted to power at J932 (AMAC).



4.1.6.1 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From examination of Figure 4.1-1, Network Tree 0200, normal power environment is without voltage sources. Open circuit voltage = 0V; Short circuit current = 0A.

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Network Tree 0200 and Figure 4.1-2, Cable Drawing:

1 Clip-In Assembly or Connector Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566 during Radar Navigator testing using DCU-9/A and the SWK Box.

- Connector J932/P3 or Cable 31-3516-27 Damaged (Worst Case)
 Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 during testing.
 See Figure 4.1-3 for source of voltage.
- (3) Cable 31-3516-1 Damaged

No voltages present. Cable runs between CSS interconnect box and weapons interface. The interconnect box opens all circuits.


4 Interconnect Box or Connector Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1566 during testing. See Figure 4.1-4 for source of voltage.

4.1.6.1 (Continued)

Worst Case Path and Calculations

REFERENCE PATH 2 in paragraph b.



Total resistance of path = .187___

 $V_{OC} = \frac{24 \text{VDC}}{24}$ $I_{SC} = \frac{24}{.158} = \frac{152}{}$ amps

Time = Less than 0.8 seconds. Current is greater than 1000% circuit breaker rating.




Figure 4.1.1 Network Tree No. 0200




FIGURE 4.1-Z CABLE DRAWING





Figure 4.1-3 Power Paths Through DCU-9/A Tester


4-22



CLIP-IN ASSEMBLY UPPER AND LOWER RIGHT WEAPON INTERFACE PINS T CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.1.6.2 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pins T of Connectors
J13 and J14 on Al14 Clip-In Assembly and Cable in Forward Bomb Bay

These interfaces are shown in Figure 5-2, T.O. 11N-H5035-2 (Change 4) - copy attached below. Maximum current available to pin T in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$ amps. Worst case current at 28VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be $\underline{1000}$ amps, assuming the pins grounded at the weapon and shorted to power at IFC relay.



4.1.6.2 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From examination of Figure 4.1-5, Network Tree 80, normal power environment is with K399 open.

Open circuit voltage = $\underline{0}V$; Short circuit current = $\underline{0}A$.

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Network Tree 80 and Figure 4.1-6, Cable Drawing.

1 Clip-In Assembly or Connector Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566 during Radar Navigator Testing with the DCU-9/A and SWK Box. See Figures 4.1-7 and 4.1-8 for voltage source.

(2) Cable 31-3516-30 or Connector J934/P2

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1566 during testing. See Figure 4.1-8 for voltage source.

3 IFC Relay K399 Damaged (Worst Case)

Pin L3 to T3 28VDC from CB549

L1 to T3 28VDC from CB548


L2 to T3 28VDC from CB550

See Figure 4.1.6 for voltage sources

(Continued) 4.1.6.2

Worst Case Path

Reference path (3) IFC Relay K399 Damaged (from paragraph b).



Total resistance of path .028 ___

 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.028} = \frac{1000}{1000}$ Amps

Time = Less then 0.8 seconds for circuit breaker to open.





Figure 4.1-5 Network Tree No. 80



CABLE DIZAWING
FIGURE 4.1-6






Figure 4.1-7 Power Paths Through DCU-9/A Tester



CLIP-IN ASSEMBLY PINS T, W & Y CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.1.6.3 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pins W & Y of Connectors J11, J12, J13 and J14; and Pin T of Connectors J11 and J12 on A114 Clip-In Assembly and Cable in Forward Bomb Bay

These interfaces are shown in Figure 5-2, T. 0. 11N-H5035-2 (Change 4) - Copy attached below. Maximum current available to pins T, W and Y in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$ amps. Worst case current at 28VDC is an abnormal environment (faulted) would be $\underline{1170}$ amps for pins T and $\underline{800}$ amps for pins W and Y assuming the pins are grounded at the weapon and shorted to power through IFC relay.



D2-118576 -1

4.1.6.3 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From examination of Figure 4.1-9, Network Tree No. 83, normal power environment or all pins: Open circuit voltage = $\underline{0}V$; short circuit current = $\underline{0}A$, because K399 is normally open.

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Network Tree No. 83 and Figure 4.1-10, Cable Drawing:

- Clip-In Assembly or Connector Damaged
 Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566
 during Radar Navigator testing. See Figures 4.1-11 and 4.1-12
 for source of voltage.
- Cable 31-3516-27 or Connector J932/P3 Damaged Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 during Radar Navigator testing. See Figure 4.1-12 for source of voltage.
- 3 IFC Relay K399 Damaged (Worst Case)

Reference Figure 4.1-10.

L2 to T2 28VDC from CB550

L1 to T1 28VDC from CB548

L1 to T2 28VDC from CB548


L2 to T1 28VDC from CB550

L3 to T1 or T2 28VDC from CB549

(Continued) 4.1.6.3

Worst Case Path c.

Reference Path 3 IFC Relay K399 Damaged. J11, J12, J13 and J14 Y or W Jll and Jl2T



Pin T

Total resistance = .024___

 $V_{OC} = \frac{28 \text{VDC}}{28}$ $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.024} = \frac{1170}{.024}$ amps

Pins W & Y

Total resistance = .035___

 $V_{OC} = \frac{28 \text{VDC}}{28}$ $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.035} = \frac{800}{.035}$ amps

Time - less then 0.8 seconds for circuit breaker to open.







Figure 4.1-9 Network Tree No. 83





CABLE DRAWING FIGURE 4.1-10



T W

ш

.012A

AFT BNS CR PNL

CBS44

J932

4-37

CABLE

02-118576 -1

4.1.6.4 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From examination of Figure 4.1-13, Network Tree No. 0198, normal open circuit voltage = 0V; short circuit current = 0A.

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Network Tree No. 0198 and Figure 4.1-14, Cable Drawing.

- Clip-In Assembly or Connector Damaged
 Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC during testing using
 DCU-9/A and the SWK box from CB1565 or CB1566. See
 Figure 4.1-15 and 4.1-16 for power paths.
- Cable 31-3516-27 or Connectors Damaged
 Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC during testing from CB1565. See Figure 4.1-15 for power paths.
- (3) Cable 25-7410 or Connectors Damaged (Worst Case)
 Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or 28VAC from CB544. See Figure 4.1-15 for power paths.
- (4) Cable 35-5531 or Connectors Damaged

 Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566

 on 28VDC from CB544 or CB585. See Figure 4.1-15 or 4.1-16 for power paths.
- (5) DCU/9A Testor or Connector Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or 28VAC from CB544. See Figure 4.1-15 for power paths.


CLIP-IN ASSEMBLY PINS

C, <u>f</u>, Z & <u>a</u>

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.1.6.4 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapons Interface Pins C, \underline{f} , Z, \underline{a} of Connectors J11, J12, J13 and J14 on A114 Clip-In Assembly and Cable in Forward Bomb Bay


These interfaces are shown in Figure 5-2, T.O. 11N-H5035-2 (change 4) Copy attached below. Maximum current available to pins C, f, Z and a in a normal environment is \underline{O} amps. Worst case current at 24VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be $\underline{218}$ amps for pin f and $\underline{110}$ amps for pin C, Z and \underline{a} , assuming the pins grounded at the weapon and shorted to power at J2065/P752 connector.



4.1.6.4 (Continued)

c. Worst Case Path and Calculations

Reference Path 3 Cable 25-7410 or Connectors Damaged.




Pin f Total resistance = .110
$$\sim$$
 V_{OC} = 24VDC
 $I_{SC} = \frac{24}{.110} = \frac{218}{.110}$ Amps
Time = less than 0.8 seconds.

Pins C, Z, & a Total resistance = .217
$$\sim$$
 V_{OC} = 24VDC
 $I_{SC} = \frac{24}{.217} = \frac{110}{amps}$
Time = 1.1 seconds maximum.

.

Figure 4.1-13 Network Tree No. 0198



CABLE DRAWING FIGURE 4.1-14






Figure 4.1-15, Power Paths Through DCU-9/A



CLIP-IN ASSEMBLY PIN h CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.1.6.5 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pin \underline{h} of Connectors J11, J12, J13 and J14 on Al14 Clip-In Assembly and Cable in Forward Bomb Bay

These interfaces are shown in Figure 5-2, T.O. 11N-H5035-2 (Change 4) - copy attached below. Note that Pin \underline{h} connects to cable Pin K through relay contacts. Maximum current available to pin \underline{h} in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$ amps. Worst case current at 24VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be $\underline{152}$ amps assuming the pin grounded at the weapon and the SWK Box not switched "Off". With the SWK "off", the relay contacts in All4 would be open.



4.1.6.5 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From examination of Figure 4.1-17, Network Tree 201/248, normal open circuit voltage = $\underline{0}$ V; short circuit current = $\underline{0}$ A.

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Network Tree 201/248 and Figure 4.1-18, Cable Drawing.

1) Clip-In Assembly or Connector Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566 during Radar Navigator testing using DCU-9/A and the SWK Box. Relay contacts (K1, K2, K3 and K4) in All4 are only closed during this period. Voltage sources are shown in Figures 4.1-19 or 4.1-20.

(2) Connector J932/P3 or Cable 31-3516-27 Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 during testing. Voltage source is shown on Figure 4.1-19.

(3) Connector J935 or Cable 31-3516-28 Damaged

Connector is located in Aft Bomb Bay and is not connected and unpowered.

4) Cable 31-3516-37 Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1566 during testing. Voltage source is shown on Figure 4.1-20.

5) Cable 25-7410 or Connector P 752/J2065

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or 28VAC from CB544 during testing. Voltage sources are shown on Figure 4.1-19.

6 Cable 35-5531 Damaged


Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566, or 28VAC from CB545. Voltage sources are shown on Figures 4.1-19 and 4.1-20.

- 4.1.6.5b (Continued)
 - Readiness Switch Panel (A399) or Connector Damaged

 Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566
 during testing. Voltage sources are shown on Figures 4.1-19
 and 4.1-20.
 - 8 DCU/9A Tester or Connector Damaged
 Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or 28VAC
 from CB544. Voltage sources are shown on Figure 4.1-19.

c. Worst Case Path and Calculations

Reference path (1), Clip-In Assy Damaged



Total Resistance of Path = .158 __

Voc

= 24VDC

 $I_{SC} = \frac{24}{1158}$

= <u>152</u> Amps

Time

= Less than 0.8 seconds. Current is greater than 1000% circuit breaker rating.

- Chan 1000% Circuit breaker rati






Figure 4.1-17 Network Tree No. 201/248



CABLE DRAWING FIGURE 411-18


4~51



CLIP-IN ASSEMBLY PINS F, H, J & c CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.1.6.6 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pins F, H, J & c of Connectors Jl1, Jl2, Jl3 and Jl4 on All4 Clip-In Assembly and Cable in Forward Bomb Bay

These interfaces are shown in Figure 5-2, T.O. 11N-H5035-2 (Change 4) - copy attached below. Maximum current available to these pins in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$ amps. Worst case current at 24VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment assuming the pins grounded at the weapon interface would be $\underline{109}$ amps for pins F, J & \underline{c} and $\underline{0}$ amps on pin H. The only fault that can supply current to pin H occurs during Radar Navigator Testing using the DCU-9/A. In this case $\underline{150}$ amps could be supplied but only for a brief period. This may result when the Clip-In Assembly is damaged.



4.1.6.6 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From examination of Figure 4.1-21, Network Tree 0199, normal open circuit voltage = 0V; Short circuit current = 0A.

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Network Tree 0199 and Figure 4.1-22, Cable Drawing.

1 Clip-In Assembly or Connector Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566 during testing using DCU-9/A and SWK Box. Voltage sources are shown on Figures 4.1-23 and 4.1-24.

- Connector J932/P3 or Cable 31-3516-27 Damaged
 Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 during testing.
 Voltage source is shown on Figure 4.1-23.
- (3) Cable 25-7410 or Connector P752/J2065 Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or 28VAC from CB544. Voltage sources are shown on Figure 4.1-23.

(4) Cable 35-5531 Damaged

Wires to pins F, J & c shorted to 24VDC prom CB1565 or CB1566 or 28VAC from CB544 and CB545. Voltage sources are shown on Figures 4.1-23 and 4.1-24.

5 DCU-9/A Testor or Connector Damaged

Wires to pins F, J & \underline{c} shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or 28VAC from CB544. Voltage sources are shown on Figure 4.1-23.

(6) Cable 31-3516-28 or Connector J935 Damaged

Cable to Aft Bomb Bay is not connected and unpowered, (common with wire to Pin F).

4.1.6.6 (Continued)

7 Cable 31-3516-37 Damaged
Wire to pin F shorted to 24VDC from CB1566 during testing. Voltage source is shown in Figure 4.1-24.

8 Cable 31-3516-35 Damaged

Cable to CSS Interconnect Box does not normally contain voltage sources. (common with wires to pins F & H).

9) <u>Cable 31-3516-1</u>

Cable from CSS Interconnect Box to Bomb Bay connectors does not normally contain voltage sources. (Common with wires to Pins F&H)


10 CSS Interconnect Box Damaged

Wire to pins F & H shorted to 24VDC from CB1566. Voltage source is shown in Figure 4.1-24.

4.1.6.6 (Continued)

c. Worst Case Paths

Pins F, J & \underline{c} Reference Path $\underline{3}$, Cable 25-7410 or Connector P752/J2065 Damaged.



Total resistance of path = .221 A-

 $V_{OC} = 24VDC$


 $I_{SC} = \frac{24}{.221} = \frac{109}{100} A$

Time = 1.2 seconds maximum for CB to open.

4.1.6.6c (Continued)

Pin H

Reference Path (1), Clip-In Assembly or Connectors Damaged.



Total Resistance of Path .158 🕰

 $V_{OC} = 24VDC*$

$$I_{SC}^{*} = 24$$
 $158 = 150 A$

Time = 0.8 seconds maximum for CB to open.

 \star Voltage present when DCU-9/A in "SAFE"




Figure 4.1-21 Network Tree No. 0199




FIGURE 4.1-22 CABLE DRAWING





Figure 4.1-23 Power Paths Through DCU-9/A Tester


4-60



CLIP-IN ASSEMBLY PINS P, E, G, L, D, B, A & R CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.1.6.7 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pins P, E, G, L, D, B, A & R of Connectors Jll, Jl2, Jl3 and Jl4 on All4 Clip-In Assembly and Cable in Forward Bomb Bay

These interfaces are shown in Figure 5-2, T.O. 11N-H5035-2 (Change 4) - copy attached below. Maximum short circuit current available to these pins in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$ amps. When the DCU-9/A is switched to "SAFE", a test mode, short circuit current to Pin P is $\underline{152}$ amps, Pin E is $\underline{131}$ amps and Pin A is $\underline{75}$ amps at 24VDC. Worst case current at 24V in an abnormal environment to Pin P would be $\underline{258}$ amps, Pin E would be $\underline{211}$ amps, and Pin A would be $\underline{109}$ amps. Worst case fault current for Pins G, L, D, B & R would be $\underline{152}$ amps at 24V.



4.1.6.7 (Continued)

Worst case current at 24VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment assuming the pins grounded would be:

Pin P - 258 Amps

E - 211 Amps

A - 109 Amps

G - 152 Amps - current available only when DCU-9/A is in "SAFE"

L - 152 Amps - current available only when DCU-9/A is in "SAFE"

D - 152 Amps - current available only when DCU-9/A is in "SAFE"

B - 152 Amps - current available only when DCU-9/A is in "SAFE"

R - 152 Amps - current available only when DCU-9/A is in "SAFE"

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From examination of Figure 4.1-25, Network Tree 43B, open circuit voltage for all subject pins would be = $\underline{0}$ amps. Short circuit current = $\underline{0}$ A. With DCU-9/A switched to "SAFE", a test mode, a power path is established as shown in Figure 4.1-27, open circuit voltage and short circuit current for pins P, E and A in this mode would be:

Pin P

Total Resistance of path = .158_

 $V_{OC} = 24VDC$

 $I_{SC} = 24 = 152 \text{ /}$

Pin E

Total Resistance of path = .183.

 $V_{OC} = 24VDC$

 $I_{SC} = 24 = 131 A$

Pin A

Total Resistance of path = .320 ...

 $V_{OC} = 24VDC$

 $I_{SC} = 24 = 75$

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Network Tree 43B and Figure 4.1-26, Cable Drawing.

4.1.6.7b (Continued)

- Clip-In Assembly or Cable Damaged (Worst Case Pins G & L)

 Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566
 during testing with DCU-9/A tester and SWK Box. Voltage sources
 are shown on Figures 4.1-27 and 4.1-28.
- 2 Cable 31-3516-27 or Connector J932/P3 (Worst Case Pins D, B &R)

 Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 during testing. Voltage source is shown on Figure 4.1-27.

(3) Cable 31-3516-1 Damaged

Cable runs between CSS and weapons interface. The CSS is normally open therefore no voltage potentials are present. This cable is

common with wires to pins B, D & R.

- (4) CSS Interconnect Box (A6832) or Connectors Damaged
 Wires to pins B, D & R shorted to 24VDC from CB1566 during testing.
 Voltage source is shown on Figure 4.1-28.
- Cable 31-3516-35 Damaged

 Cable to CSS Interconnect Box (A6832) does not normally contain voltage sources (common with wire to pin R).
- (6) Cable 31-3516-28 Damaged

 Cable to Aft Bomb Bay is open and does not contain voltage sources (common with wire to pin L).
- 7 Cable 31-3516-37 Damaged
 Wire to pin L shorted to 24VDC from CB1566 during testing. Voltage source is shown on Figure 4.1-28.
- (8) Cable 25-7410 or Connector P752/J2065 Damaged (Worst Case-pins P,E & A)
 Wires to pins A, E, G, L & P shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or 28VAC from
 Voltage sources are shown on Figure 4.1-27.

- - Wires to pins A, E, G, L & P shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566, or 28VAC from CB544 or CB545. Voltage sources are shown on Figures 4.1-27 or 4.1-28.
- DCU-9/A Tester or Connector Damaged

 Wires to pins A, E, G, L & P shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or 28VAC from CB544. Voltage sources are shown on Figure 4.1-27.
- Readiness Switch Panel (A399) or Connector Damaged


 Wires to pins G, L & A shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566

 during testing. Voltage sources are shown on Figures 4.1-27 and
 4.1-28.

4.1.6.7 (Continued)

c. Worst Case Paths

Pins P, E & A Reference Path ® Cable 25-7410 Damaged.



 $V_{OC} = 24VDC$

$$I_{SC} = \frac{24}{.089} = \frac{258}{.089} A$$

Time = Less than 0.8 seconds. Current exceeds 1000% rating of CB.

Pin E Total resistance of path = .114 ___

 $V_{OC} = 24VDC$

$$I_{SC} = \frac{24}{.114} = \frac{211}{} A$$

Time = Less than 0.8 seconds. Current exceeds 1000% rating of CB.

Pin A Total resistance of path = .221 ---


 $V_{OC} = 24VDC$

$$I_{SC} = \frac{24}{.221} = \frac{109}{100} A$$

Time = Less than 1.4 seconds.

4.1.6.7c (Continued)

Pins G & L Reference Path 1 Clip-In Assembly Damaged



Total Resistance of Path = .158 \sim


$$V_{OC} = 24VDC$$

$$I_{SC} = \frac{24}{158} = \frac{152}{1}$$
 A

Time = Less than 0.8 seconds. Current exceeds 1000% rating of CB.

Note: Relay K closed only when SWK Box is in "UL", "LL", "UR" or "LR".

Pins D, B & R Reference Path (2) Cable 31-3516-27 or Connector J932/P3 Damaged.



4.1.6.7c (Continued)

Total Resistance of Path = .158 Ω

 $V_{OC} = 24VDC$

 $I_{SC} = 152 A$

Time = Less than 0.8 seconds. Current exceeds 1000% rating of CB.

^{*} Voltage source is present only when DCU-9/A is in "SAFE" during Radar Navigator Testing.







Figure 4.1-25 Network Tree No. 43B



CABLE DRAWING FIGURE 4.1-26






CLIP-IN ASSEMBLY PIN X CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.1.6.8 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pin X on Connectors J11, J12, J13 and J14 of the Clip-In Assembly and Cable in the Forward Bomb Bay

These interfaces are shown in Figure 5-2, T.O. 11N-H5035-2, (Change 4) - copy attached below. Maximum current available to pin X in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$ amps. Worst case current in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be $\underline{152}$ amps assuming the pins grounded at the weapon interfaces when current is available through the DCU-9/A tester (a test mode).



4.1.6.8 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From examination of Figure 4.1-29, Network Tree 202, open circuit voltage for pin X is = \underline{OV} . Short circuit current = \underline{OA} . This circuit is not connected to the aircraft. The cable between All4 Clip-In Relay Box and J932 AMAC has no wire to pin X.

b. Fault Analysis


The following postulated fault was analyzed using Network Tree 202.

1) Clip-In Assembly Damaged (Worst Case)

Wires to pin X shorted to 24VDC from CB1565 or CB1566 during testing using the DCU-9/A and the SWK Box. Voltage sources as shown in Figures 4.1-30 and 4.1-31.

4.1.6.8 (Continued)

- c. Worst Case Fault
 - ① Clip-In Assembly Damaged



Total Resistance of Path = .158 Ω

 $V_{OC} = 24VDC$

 $I_{SC} = 152 A$

Time = Less than 0.8 seconds. Current exceeds 1000% CB rating.





Figure 4.1-29 Network Tree 202




4.1.7 <u>Circuit Analysis Packages - B52/AGM-69A</u>

The following packages present the power and load analyses of AGM-69A arming circuits on the launcher or pylon. Some packages describe the circuit for both the launcher and pylon while other packages describe separate circuits.

Analysis Interface	<u>Function</u>
4.1.7.1 J1 Pin 97	SAF Prearm Command
[J1 Pin 82	Missile Electronic Power Missile Electronic Power Missile Electronic Power
4.1.7.2 Pin 92	Missile Electronic Power
₹ Pin 96	Missile Electronic Power
4.1.7.3 J1 Pin 57	Propulsion Safe (Launcher)
CJ1 Pin 2	Battery Activate
4.1.7.4 J1 Pin 2 Pin 10 Pin 26	Accumulator Activate
Pin 26	Fin Unlock
4.1.7.5 J1 Pin 57	Propulsion Safe (Pylon)
J1 Pin 82	Missile Electronic Power (Pylon)
4.1.7.6 J1 Pin 82 Pin 92	Missile Electronic Power (Pylon)
└ Pin 96	Missile Electronic Power (Pylon)
4.1.7.7 Jl Pin	(Ejector) Arm Solenoid
J1 Pin 20	SAF Class III A Command
4.1.7.8 J Pin 60	SAF Class III A Command SAF Class III B Command


NOTE: Power Profiles - In all cases, short circuit current, caused by faults was found to be constant because of the absence of inductors and capacitors in the circuits investigated. Voltage source impedance was assumed to be zero ohms. A typical fault current versus time profile is shown here.



FAULT CURRENT PROFILE

4.1.7.1 Circuit Analysis Package, AGM 69A Interface Pin 97, Connector J1, Missile #1 on the Launcher & Left Pylon

This interface is shown in Figure 5-7, T.O. 11L1-2-8-2, (Change 12) and T.O. 16W6-19-2 (Change 3). Maximum current available to pin 97 in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$ amps. Worst case current at 118VAC in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be $\underline{900}$ amps for the missile on the launcher and $\underline{983}$ amps for the missile on the pylon assuming the pins grounded.



Refer to Figure 2-38 of T.O. 1B-52G-2-39GA-1 For Circuit Details

4.1.7.1 (Continued)

a. Normal Power & Load Analysis

From an examination of Figure 4.1-52, Cable Drawing - showing applicable circuits in the MCU, open circuit voltage for pin 97 is 0 VDC (the electronic switch is off) and short circuit current is OA.

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Network Tree 998 and 99C, and Figure 4.1-52, Cable Drawing.

Pin 97, J1 Missile #1 Launcher

(1) Cable W1 Damaged

Wire to pin 97 shorted to 28VDC from CB1411, 118VAC from CB1395 if heater power is on, or to guidance and logic signals. CB1411 (15A) 28VDC Missile Electronic Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

55 ft of #10 wire = $.06 \, \Omega$

switch = $.01 \Omega$

Maximum current available = 400 A

CB1395 (15A) 118VAC Missile Heater Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

47 ft of #12 wire = .095 \square

6 ft of #16 wire = .027 ___

switch = .01 -2

Maximum current available = 900 A

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current output from these sources is device limited to less than other sources listed.

4.1.7.1 (Continued)

2 Launcher MCU Damaged

Wire to pin 97 shorted to 27VDC from CB1484, ±22VDC from power supply in the switch unit, or guidance/logic signals.
CB1484 (5A) 27VDC Essential Power

Resistance of wire from CB to MCU 44 ft of #20 wire = .405 Ω

Maximum current available = 66 A

Power Supply in Switch Unit

Current output is less than other source listed. The magnitude is unknown. The specification is not available.

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current output from these sources is device limited to less than other sources listed.

3 Cable W13, W22 or W19 Damaged

Wire to electronic switch shorted to 27VDC from CB1484 (Essential Bus) or to guidance and logic signals in the same cable. This may cause the electronic switch to turn on supplying 300 mA at 27VDC to pin 97.

4 Connector J16462/Pl or Cable 31-3564-119 Damaged

Wire to electronic switch shorted to 27VDC from CB1484 (Essential Bus) or to guidance and logic signals in the same cable. This may cause the electronic switch to turn on supplying 300 mA at 27VDC to pin 97.

Pin 97, J1 Missile #1 Left Pylon

(5) Cable W6 Damaged

Wire to pin 97 shorted to 28VDC from CB1444 (ELEX Bus), 118VAC from CB1394 if heater power is on, or to guidance and logic signals.

4.1.7.1b (Continued)

(5) (Continued)

CB1444 (15A) 28VDC Missile Electronic Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

58 ft of #20 wire = .11 ___

switch = .01 \sim

Maximum current available = 233 A

CB1394 (10A) 118VAC Heater Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

switch = $.01 \Omega$

Maximum current available = 938 A

Guidance and Logic Signals

The current output of these sources is device limited to less . than other sources listed.

6 Left Pylon MCU Damaged

Wire to pin 97 shorted to 27VDC from CB1483 (Essential Bus), ± 22VDC from power supply in the switch unit, or to guidance and logic signals.

CB1483 (5A) 27VDC Essential Power

Resistance of wire from CB to MCU

50 ft of #20 wire = .619 Ω_{-}

Maximum current available = 43.5 A

Power Supply in Switch Unit

Current output is less than other listed source. The magnitude is unknown. The specification is not available.

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current output from these sources is device limited to less than other sources listed.

4.1.7.1b (Continued)

7 Cable Wl Left Pylon, Connector J16460/Pl, Cable 31-3564-114, Connector P16539/J16539 or Cable 31-3564-117 Damaged

Wire to electronic switch shorted to 28VDC from CB1411, 27VDC from CB1483 or guidance and logic signals in the same cable. This may cause the switch to turn on supplying 300 mA at 27VDC to pin 97.

Pin 97, Jl Missile #1 Launcher or Left Pylon

8 PDU Damaged

Wire to electronic switch of both MCU's shorted to 118VAC from CB1487 (AC Bus), 118VAC-3 ϕ (AC Bus) from CB1422, 27VDC from CB1486, or guidance and logic signals. This may cause the switches to to turn on supplying 300 mA at 27VDC to pin 97 of both missiles.

Cabling from PDU to Right Pylon MCU Damaged

Wire to electronic switch of both MCU's shorted to 27VDC from CB1485 (Essential Bus) or guidance and logic signals. This may cause the switches to turn on supplying 300 mA at 27VDC to pin 97 of both missiles.

10 Right Pylon MCU Damaged

Wire to electronic switch of both MCU's shorted to 27VDC from CB1485 (Essential Bus), +22VDC from Power Supply in the Switch Unit, or guidance and logic signals. This may cause the switches to turn on supplying 300 mA at 27VDC to pin 97 of both missiles.

(11) Cable 31-3564-52 Damaged

Wire to electronic switches in both MCU's are cabled with wires running between the PDU and MDU/BCU. These wires primarily carry guidance, digital information and other low level signals. A short to them may cause the switches to turn on supplying 300 mA at 27VDC to pin 97 of both missiles.

4.1.7.1b (Continued)


(12) CSS Interconnect Box Damaged

Wires to electronic switch of both MCU's shorted to 24VDC from CB1566. This may cause the electronic switches to turn on supplying 27VDC at 300 mA to both missiles. The 24 VDC is available only when the SWK Box is switched to "LL".

Note: All circuit breakers or located in the AGM-69A Power Distribution Box, A482 except CB1566 which is located in the Aft BNS CB PNL, A174.

c. Worst Case Paths

Launcher Missile pin 97: Reference path (1) Cable Wl Damaged.



Total resistance of path = .122 12


 $V_{OC} = 118VAC$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{.118}{.122} = \frac{.900}{.122}$

Time = current exceeds 6000% rating of CB. The time will be less than .13 sec (3000% rating).

4.1.7.1c (Continued)

Left Pylon Missile pin 97: Reference path (5) Cable W6 Damaged.



Total resistance of path = .12 ____

 $V_{OC} = 118VAC$

$$I_{SC} = \frac{118}{.12} = \frac{983}{.12} A$$

Time = current exceeds 9000% rating of CB. The time will be less than .125 Sec (3000% rating). Reference CB Spec D10-30108.




Figure 4.1-51 Network Tree No. 99B-99C (Sheet 1 of 2)




Figure 4.1-51 Network Tree No. 99B-99C (Sheet 2 of 2)




FIGURE 4.1-52. CABLE DRAWING


4.1.7.2 Circuit Analysis Package, AGM-69A Interface Pins 82, 92, and 96, Connector J1, Missile #1 on the Launcher

This interface is shown in Figure 5-7 of T.O. 11L1-2-8-2, Change 12. Maximum current available to the pins in a normal environment with the pins grounded would be:

System Off: Voc = OV; Isc = O A

System On: Voc = 28 VDC; Isc = 368 A

Worst case current at $\,$ 28VDC in an abnormal environment would be 1220 A with the pins grounded.



Refer to Figure 2-40 of T.O. 1B-52G-2-39GA-1 For Circuit Details

4.1.7.2 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From examination of Figure 4.1-53, Network Tree 118 and Figure 4.1-54, Cable Drawing, open circuit voltage and short circuit voltage is as follows:

Ground, System Off: Voc = OV; Isc = OA

Airborn, System On: Current to pins is supplied by CB1411, 28VDC ELEX Bus, through 37 ft. of #10 wire (.044 Ω) and 17 ft. of #12 wire (.0323 Ω). Total resistance of path = .076 Ω .

Therefore:

Voc = 28 VDC Isc = $\frac{28}{.026}$ = 368 A

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Figures 4.1.53 and 4.1.54:

1 Cable WI Damaged

Wires subject pins shorted to 118 VAC from CB 1395 if heater power is on.

CB1395 (15A) 118 VAC Missile Heater Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

47 ft. of #12 wire = $.095\Omega$

6 ft. of #16 wire = $.027\Omega$

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 967 A

(2) Switch Unit Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to:

118 VAC from CB 1395, Heater Power

28 VDC from CB 1433, Hydraulic Power

28 VDC from CB 1412 through CB 1418, Missile 2-8 ELEX Power

118 VAC from CB 1427, Launcher AC

28 VDC from CB 1435, Missile Valve

4.1.7.2b (Fault 2 Continued)

- CB 1395 (15A) 118 VAC Missile Heater Power Resistance of wire from CB to switch unit 47 ft. of #12 wire = $.095\Omega$ Maximum current available at 118 VAC = $\underline{1242}$ A
- CB 1433 (60A) 28 VDC Hydraulic Power Resistance of wire from CB to Switch Unit 48 ft. of #4 wire = $.013\Omega$

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 2154 A

CB 1412 - CB 1418 (15A) 28 VDC Missile ELEX Power Resistance of wire from CB's to Switch Unit

37 ft. of #10 wire = $.044\Omega$

10 ft. of #12 wire = $.019\Omega$

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 444 A

CB 1427 (5A) 118 VAC Launcher AC-

Resistance of wire from CB to Switch Unit

37 ft. of #20 wire = $.34\Omega$

10 ft. of #16 wire = $.045\Omega$

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 306 A

CB 1435 (7.5A) 28 VDC Missile Valve

Resistance of wire from CB to Switch Unit

47 ft. of #16 wire = $.21\Omega$

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 133 A

(3) Cable W10 Damaged

Same faults as given in 2 above omitting power from CB 1395, CB 1417, CB 1418, and CB 1433.

(4) Cable W23 or W17

Same faults as given in (2) above.

4.1.7.2b (Fault 5 Continued)

(5) Cable 31-3564-124 or Connector P2/J2371 Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to:

118 VAC from CB 1395, Heater Power

28 VDC from CB's 1412 through CB 1417, Missile 2-7, ELEX Power

118 VAC from CB 1427, Launcher AC

28 VDC from CB 1435, Missile valve

CB 1395 (15A) 118 VAC Missile Heater Power

Resistance of wire from CB to connector

37 ft. #12 wire = $.07\Omega$

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 1685 A

CB 1412 - CB 1417, (15A) 28 VDC, Missile 2-7 ELEX Power

Resistance of wire from CB to connector

37 ft. #10 wire = $.044\Omega$

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 636 A

CB 1427 (5A) 118 VAC Launcher AC

Resistance of wire from CB to connector

37 ft. #20 wire = $.34\Omega$

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 347 A

CB 1435 (7.5A) 28 VDC Missile Valve

Resistance of wire from CB to Switch Unit

37 ft. of #16 wire = $.166\Omega$


Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 168 A

Note: All circuit breakers are located in the AGM-69A Power Distribution Box.

4.1.7.2b (Fault 5 Continued)

c. Worst Case Path

Reference Path ② Switch Unit Damaged



Total Resistance of path = $.023\Omega$

Voc = 28 VDC

 $Isc = \frac{28}{.023} = \underline{1220} A$

Time = Minimum trip time shown on calibration curve is 1.5 seconds for 500 amps. Therefore the time for 1220 would be less than 1.5 seconds.




Figure 4.1-53 Network Tree No. 118





FIGURE 4.1-54. CABLE DRAWING

4.1.7.3 Circuit Analysis Package, SRAM, Interface Pin 57 of Connector J1, Missile 1 on the Launcher

This interface is shown in Figure 5-7, of T.O. 11L1-2-8-2, change 12. The current available to this pin in a normal environment is 0 amps. The worst-case current in an abnormal environment (faulted) is $\underline{411.76}$ A (assuming the pin is grounded).



Refer to Figure 2-38 of T.O. 1B-52G-2-39GA-1 For Circuit Details.

4.1.7.3 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From an examination of the Figure 4.1-55, Network Tree 151, the open circuit voltage is OV and the short circuit current is OA. The circuit passes through normally open relay contacts in the Power Distribution Panel.

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Network Tree 151 and the Cable Diagram, Figures 4.1-55 and 4.1-56.

1 Damage to Connector J1 or Cable W1

Pin 57 may be shorted to 118 VAC through CB 1395, if heater power is on, or to 28 VDC through CB 1411.

CB 1395 (15A) 118 VAC Missile Heater Power Resistance of wire from CB to missile

47 ft. of #12 wire = .095Ω

6 ft. of #16 wire = $.027\Omega$

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 967 A

CB 1411 (15A) 28 VDC Missile Electronic Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile

37 ft. of #10 wire = $.044\Omega$

17 ft. of #12 wire = $.0323\Omega$

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 3680 A

Damage to Relay Assembly

The wires to the subject pins may be shorted to 28 VDC through CB 1433, CB 1435, CB 1411-CB 1418 or shorted to 118 VAC through CB 1395 or CB 1427.

CB 1433 (60A) 28 VDC Hydraulic Power Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly 48 ft. of #4 wire = $.013\Omega$ Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 2154 A

4.1.7.3b (Fault 2 Continued)

CB 1435 (7.5A) 28 VDC Missile Bypass Valve Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly 47 ft. of #16 wire = $.21\Omega$

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 133 A

CB 1411 -CB 1418 (15A) 28 VDC Missile Electronic Power Resistance of wire from CB's to Relay Assembly 37 ft. of #10 wire = $.044\Omega$ 10 ft. of #12 wire = $.019\Omega$

avinum cumpant available at 20 VDC - AAA

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = $\underline{444}$ A

CB 1395 (15A) 118 VAC Missile Heater Power Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly 47 ft. of #12 wire = $.095\Omega$

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 1242 A

CB 1427 (5A) 118 VAC Launcher AC Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly 37 ft. of #20 wire = $.34\Omega$ 10 ft. of #16 wire = $.045\Omega$

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 306 A

3 Cable W10 Damaged

Faults are the same as (2) except power from CB 1395, CB 1417, CB 1418, and CB 1433 is not available.

(4) Cable W23 or Cable W17 Damaged

Faults same as (3) above.

4.1.7.3b (Fault 5 Continued)

(5) Cable 31-3564-124 or Connector J2371 Damaged

Wires to subject pins may be shorted to 28 VDC through CB 1411-CB 1418 or through CB 1435. Wires may be shorted to 118 VAC through CB 1395 or CB 1427.

CB 1411 - CB 1418 (15A) 28 VDC Missile Electronic Power Resistance of wire from CB to Connector 37 ft. of #12 wire = $.07\Omega$

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 1685 A

CB 1435 (7.5A) 28 VDC Missile Bypass Valve Resistance of wire from CB to Connector 37 ft. of #16 wire = $.166\Omega$

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 168 A

CB 1395 (15A) 118 VAC Missile Heater Power Resistance of wire from CB to Connector 37 ft. of #12 wire = $.07\Omega$

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 1685 A


CB 1427 (5A) 118 VAC Launcher AC Power Resistance of wire from CB to Connector 37 ft. of #20 wire = $.34\Omega$ Maximum current available at 118 VAC = .347 A

Note: All circuit breakers are located in the AGM-69A Power Distribution Box.

4.1.7.3 (Continued)

c. Worst Case Path

Refer to Fault 2, Relay Assembly Damaged



Total Resistance of path = $.068\Omega$

Voc = 28 VDC

$$Isc = \frac{28}{.068} = 411.76 A$$

Time = 2.0 seconds




FIGURE 4.1-55. NETWORK TREE 151





FIGURE 4.1-56. CABLE DRAWING

4-103

4.1.7.4 Circuit Analysis Package, AGM 69A Interface Pins 10, 26, and 2, Connector J1, Missile #1 on the Launcher and Left Pylon

This interface is shown in Figure 5-7 of T.O. 11L1-2-8-2, Change 12. Maximum current available to these pins in a normal environment is <u>0</u> amps. Worst case current at 118 VAC in an abnormal (faulted) environment with the pins grounded would be:

Launcher Missile 900 A
Pylon Missile 983 A



Refer to Figure 2-39 of T.O. 1B-52G-2-39GA-1 For Circuit Details.

4.1.7.4 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From an examination of Figure 4.1-58, Cable Drawing, open circuit voltage is OV and the short circuit current is OA. The electronic switches and EED power are normally off prior to launch.

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Network Tree 144-145 for Launcher Mounted Missile and Figure 4.1-58.

(1) Cable W1 Damaged

Wires to pins 10, 2 and 26 shorted to 28 VDC from CB 1411, to 118VAC from CB1395 (if heater power is on) or to guidance and logic signals.

CB 1411 (15A) 28 VDC Missile Electronic Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

55 ft. of #10 wire = $.06\Omega$

Switch = $.01\Omega$

Maximum current available = 400 A

CB 1395 (15A) 118 VAC Missile Heater Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

47 ft. of #12 wire = $.095\Omega$

6 ft. of #16 wire = $.027\Omega$

Maximum current available = 940 A

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current from these sources is device limited and is less than other sources listed.

4.1.7.4b (Continued)

(2) <u>Launcher MCU Damaged</u>

Wire to pins 10, 2 and 26 shorted to 27 VDC from CB 1484, \pm 22VDC from Power Supply in the Switch Unit, or to guidance and logic signals.

CB 1484 (5A) 27 VDC Essential Power

Resistance of wire from CB to MCU

44 ft. of #20 wire = $.405\Omega$

Maximum current available = 66 A

Power Supply in Switch Unit

Current output less than other source listed. The magnitude of the current is unknown since the part specification is not available.

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current output is device limited and is less than other sources listed.

For Pylon Mounted Missile

(1) Cable W6 Damaged

Wires to pins 10, 2 and 26 shorted to 28 VDC from CB 1444, 118VAC from CB1394, if heater power is on, or to guidance and logic signals.

CB 1444 (15A) 28 VDC Missile Electronic Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

58 ft of #20 wire = $.11\Omega$

Switch = $.01\Omega$

Maximum current available = 233 A

CB 1394 (10A) 118 VAC Heater Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

58 ft. of #12 wire = $.11\Omega$

Switch = $.01\Omega$

Maximum current available = 983 A

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current output from these sources is device limited and is less than other sources listed.

4.1.7.4b (Continued)

2 Left Pylon MCU Damaged

Wires to pins 10, 2 and 26 shorted to 27 VDC from CB 1483, \pm 22VDC from power supply in Switch Unit or guidance and logic signals.

CB 1483 (5A) 27 VDC Essential Power

Resistance of wire from CB to MCU

50 ft. of #20 wire = $.619\Omega$

Maximum current available = 43.5 A

Power Supply in Switch Unit

Current output is less than other listed source. The magnitude is unknown since the specification is unavailable.

Guidance and Logic Signals


Current output from these sources is device limited and is less than other sources listed.

Note: Circuit Breakers are located in the AGM-69A Power Distribution Panel.

c. Worst Case Paths

For Launcher Mounted Missile

Reference Path (1) Cable W1 Damaged



Total Resistance of Path \approx .122 Ω

Voc = 118 VAC


$$Isc = \frac{118}{.122} = 900 A$$

Time - Current rating exceeds 6000% rating of CB. The time will be less than .13 sec. (3000% rated).

4.1.7.4c (Continued)

For Pylon Mounted Missile

Reference Path (1) Cable W6 Damaged



58 ft. of #12 wire total

Total resistance $.12\Omega$

Voc = 118 VAC

 $Isc = \frac{118}{.12} = 983$ A

Time - Current exceeds 9000% rating of CB. The time will be less than .125 sec. (3000% rated), Reference CB Spec. D10-30108.




Figure 4.1-57 Network Tree No. 144-145

NOTE: CABLING AND CONNECTORS ARE

SHOWN FOR MISSILE MOUNTED IN THE LAUNCHER. FOR MISSILE MOUNTED ON THE LEFT PYLON:

W1 IS W6 P24 IS P15 P32 IS P32 J1 IS J1





FIGURE 4.1-58. CABLE DRAWING

4.1.7.5 Circuit Analysis Package, SRAM, Interface Pin 57 of Connector Jl, Missile 1 on the Left Pylon

This interface is shown in Figure 5-7 in T.O. 16W6-19-2, Change 3. The current available to this pin in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$ A. The worst case current in an abnormal environment (faulted) is $\underline{1115.5}$ A, assuming the pin is grounded.



Refer to Figure 2-38 of T.O. 1B-52G-2-39GA-1 For Circuit Details

4.1.7.5 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From an examination of Figure 4.1-59, Sneak Circuit Network Tree 153, the normal open circuit voltage is \underline{OV} and the short circuit current is \underline{OA} . The circuit passes through normally open relay contacts in the Power Distribution Panel.

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults were analyzed using Figure 4.1-59, Network Tree 153 and Figure 4.1-60, Cable Drawing.

1 Damage to Connector J1 or Cable W6

Pin 57 may be shorted to 28 VDC through CB 1444 or to 118 VAC through CB 1394.

CB 1444 (15A) 28 VDC Missile Electronic Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

58 ft. of #12 wire = .1102Ω

Relay Contact Resistance = .01Ω

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 232 A

CB 1394 (10A) 118 VAC Missile Heater Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile

58 ft. of #12 wire = .1102Ω

Relay contact resistance = .01Ω

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 981.7 A

4.1.7.5b (Continued)

(2) Damage to the Relay Assembly or Cable W2

Wires to the subject pin may be shorted to 28 VDC through CB 1450, CB 1444, CB 1434, or shorted to 118 VAC through CB 1401 or CB 1394.

CB 1450 (7.5A) 28 VDC Bypass Valve Power Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly 52 ft. of #12 wire = .0988 Ω

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 283.4 A

CB 1444 (15A) 28 VDC Missile Electronic Power Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly 52 ft. of #12 wire = $.0988\Omega$

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 283.4 A

CB 1434 (60A) 28 VDC Missile Hydraulic Power Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly 52 ft. of #4 wire = .0137 Ω

Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 2043.8 A

CB 1401 (5A) 118 VAC AC Power

Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly 52 ft. of #12 wire = $.0988\Omega$

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 1194.33A

CB 1394 (10A) 118 VAC Missile Heater Power Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly

52 ft. of #12 wire = $.0988\Omega$

Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 1194.33A

Damage to Connector J2367 or Cable 31-3564-121

The wire to pin 57 may be shorted to 28 VDC through CB 1450, CB 1444 or to 118 VAC through CB 1401 or CB 1394.

CB 1444 (15A) 28 VDC Missile Electronic Power Resistance of wire from CB to Connector 44 ft. of #12 wire = $.0836\Omega$ Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 334.9 A

4.1.7.5b (Continued)


(Continued)

CB 1450 (7.5A) 28 VDC Bypass Valve Power
Resistance of wire from CB to Connector
44 ft. of #12 wire = .0836 Ω Maximum current available at 28 VDC = 334.9 A
CB 1401 (5A) 118 VAC AC Power
Resistance of wire from CB to Connector
44 ft. of #12 wire = .0836 Ω Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 1141.5A
CB 1394 (10A) 118 VAC Missile Heater Power
Resistance of wire from CB to Connector
44 ft. of #12 wire = .0836 Ω Maximum current available at 118 VAC = 1141.5A

4.1.7.5 (Continued)

c. Worst Case Path

2 Damage to Relay Assembly



Interface Pin 57

Total wire Resistance = 0.0251Ω

Voc = 118 VAC

 $Isc = \frac{118}{.0251} = \underline{1115.5A}$

Time - Minimum trip time shown on calibration curve is 1.5 seconds for 500 amps.

Therefore the time for 1115.5 amps would be less than 1.5 sec.




FIGURE 4.1-59. NETWORK TREE 153





FIGURE 4.1-EO. CABLE DRAWING

4.1.7.6 Circuit Analysis Package, AGM-69A Interface Pins 82, 92 & 96 of Connector Jl, Missile 1 on the Left Pylon

These interfaces are shown in Figure 5-7 and T.O. 16W6-19-2, Change 3. The maximum current available to these pins in a normal environment is \underline{OA} for ground alert and $\underline{254A}$ for airborne conditions. The worst case current at 28VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be 1115.5A with the pins grounded.



Refer to Figure 2-40 of T.O. 1B-52G-2-39GA-1 For Circuit Details

4.1.7.6 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From examination of Figure 4.1-61, Network Tree 175, and Figure 4.1-62, open circuit voltage and short circuit current are:

Ground alert: $V_{OC} = 0$ VDC

(Missile OFF)

 $I_{SC} = 0$ A

Airborne:

 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$

(Missile ON)

 $I_{SC} = 232A$

b. Fault Analysis

The following postulated faults have been analyzed using Network Tree 175 and Cable Diagram, 4.1-61 and 4.1-62.

Damage to Connector Jl or Cable W6

Pins 82, 92 and 96 may be shorted to 118VAC through CB1394 if missile heater power is on.

CB1394 (10A) 118VAC Missile Heater Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile

58 ft of #12 wire = .1102

Resistance of relay contacts = .01

Maximum current available at 118VAC = 981.7A

2 Damage to Relay Assembly or Cable W2

The wires to the subject pins may be shorted to 28VDC through CB1450, CB1444 and CB1434. The wires may also be shorted to 118VAC through CB1401 and CB1394.

4.1.7.6b (Continued)

CB1450 (7.5A) 28VDC Bypass Valve Power
Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly
52 ft of #12 wire = .0988
Maximum current available at 28VDC = 283A

CB1444 (15A) 28VDC Missile Electronic Power
Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly
52 ft of #12 wire = .0988
Maximum current available at 28VDC = 283A

CB1434 (60A) 28VDC Missile Hydraulic Power
Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly
52 ft of #4 wire = .0137
Maximum current available at 28VDC = 2043A

CB1401(5A) 118VAC AC Power

Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly

52 ft of #12 wire = .0988

Maximum current available at 118VAC = 1194A

CB1394 (10A) 118VAC Missile Heater Power
Resistance of wire from CB to Relay Assembly
52 ft of #12 wire = .0988
Maximum current available at 118VAC = 1194A

3 Damage to Connector J2367 or Cable 31-3564-121

The wires to pins 82, 92, 96 may be shorted to 28VDC through CB1450 or to 118YAC through CB1401 or CB1394.

CB1450 (7.5A) 28YDC Bypass Yalve Power

Resistance of wire from CB to Connector

44ft of #12 wire = .0836

Maximum current available at 28YDC = 334A

4.1.7.6b (Continued)

(3) (Continued)
CB1401 (5A) 118VAC AC Power
Resistance of wire from CB to Connector
44 ft of #12 wire = .0836

Maximum current available at 118VAC = 1141A.


CB1394 (10A) 118VAC Missile Heater Power
Resistance of wire from CB to Connector
44 ft of #12 wire = .0836
Maximum current available at 118VAC = 1141A

NOTE. All circuit breakers are located in the AGM-69A Power Distribution Box.

4.1.7.6 (Continued)

c. Worst Case Path

Reference path 2 Damage to Relay Assembly



Pins 82, 92, 96

Total resistance = 0.0251 ~

 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$

 $I_{SC} = 1115.5 A$

Time = Minimum trip time shown in calibration curve is 1.5 seconds for 500 A. Trip time for 2413 A will be less than 1.5 seconds.




Figure 4.1 Network Tree No. 175





FIGURE 4.1-62. CABLE DRAWING 4-124

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4.1.7.7 Circuit Analysis Package, AGM-69A Ejector Interface pin <u>r</u>, Arm Solenoid, Launcher and Pylon

These interfaces are shown in Figure 5-7 of T.O. 11L1-2-8-2, Change 12. Maximum current available to this pin in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$ amps. Worst case current at 27VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment for the launcher ejector pin is $\underline{54}$ amps and for the pylon ejector is $\underline{37}$ amps with the pins grounded.



4.1.7.7 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From an examination of Figure 4.1-64, Cable Drawing, the open circuit voltage is OV and the short circuit current is OA. The electronic switch is normally off prior to launch.

b. Fault Analysis

The following faults were analyzed using Figure 4.1-64.

1 Cable Wll Damaged or (2) W4 Damaged

Wire to pin \underline{r} shorted to missile away monitor from pin \underline{a} . Pin \underline{a} is a ground path for the missile away monitor lamp located in the Weapon Release Indicator Panel, and a relay in the Switch Unit. Current available to the interface cannot be calculated since value of current limiting resistor and other components in the circuit is unknown (schematics in the MCU are not available).

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current output from these sources is device limited and is less than expected from the above fault.

(3) Launcher MCU Damaged

Wire to pin \underline{r} shorted to 27VDC from CB1484, $\underline{+}$ 22VDC from power supply in the switch unit or guidance and logic signals. CB1484 (5A) 27VDC Essential Power

Resistance of wire from CB to MCU

44 ft of #20 wire = .405 ohms

Maximum current available = 66 amps

Power Supply in Switch Unit

Current output is less than above listed fault. Current magnitude is unknown since specification is not available.

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current from these sources is device limited to less than other sources listed.

4.1.7.7b (Continued)

4) Pylon MCU Damaged

Wire to pin \underline{r} shorted to 27VDC from CB1483, $\underline{+}$ 22VDC from power supply in Switch Unit or guidance and logic signals. CB1485 (5A) 27VDC Essential Power

Resistance of wire from CB to MCU 50 ft of #20 wire .619 ohms

Maximum current available = 43.5 amps

Power supply in switch unit


Current output is less than other listed fault circuit magnitude is unknown since specification is not available.

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current output from these sources is device limited to less than other sources listed.

c. Fault Analysis

For launch ejector reference path 2 Launcher MCU Damaged.




NOTE: All circuit breakers are located in the AGM-69A Power Distribution Box.

4.1.7.7 (Continued)

c. (Continued)

For pylon ejector reference path(4) Pylon MCU Damaged.







FIGURE 4.1-63. NETWORK TREE 148



4.1.7.7 (Continued)

Launcher Ejector shown

For pylon ejector:

J11 is J11


P59 is P21

W11 is W4

P61 is P23

Jl is Jl

- 1) is 2
- 3 is 4




0 Faults

FIGURE 4.1-64 CABLE DIAGRAM

4.1.7.8 Circuit Analysis Package, AGM-69A Interface pins 20 and 60,
Connector Jl, Missile #1 On the Launcher and Left Pylon
This interface is shown in Figure 5-37 and T.O. 11L1-2-8-2, (Change 12).
Maximum current available to these pins in a normal environment is OA.
Worst case current at 118VAC in an abnormal (faulted) environment assuming the pins grounded would be:

Launcher missile pins - 900APylon missile pins - 983A



Refer to Figure 2-38 of T.O. 1B-52G-39GA-1 For Circuit Details

4.1.7.8 (Continued)

a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

From an examination of Figure 4.1-65, Cable Drawing, the open circuit voltage is OV and the short circuit current is OA. The electronic switches are normally off prior to the launch phase.

b. Fault Analysis

The following faults were analyzed using Figure 4.1-65.

For Launcher Mounted Missile

1) Cable WI Damaged

Wires to pins 20 and 60 shorted to 28VDC from CB1411, 118VAC from CB1395 if heater power is on, or to guidance and logic signals.

CB1411 (15A) 28VDC Missile Electronic Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

55 ft of #10 wire = $.06 \, \triangle$

switch = .01 \triangle

Maximum current available = 400A

CB1395 (15A) 118VAC Missile Heater Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

47 ft of #12 wire = .095 :-

6 ft of #16 wire = .027 ---

Maximum current available = 940A

Guidance and Logic Signals

Currently output of these sources is device limited to less than other sources listed.

4.1.7.8b (Continued)

2 Launcher MCU Damaged

Wires to pins 20 and 60 shorted to 27VDC from CB1484, \pm 22VDC from Power Supply in the Switch Unit, or guidance and logic signals.

CB1484 (5A) 27VDC Essential Power

Resistance of wire from CB to MCU

44 ft of #20 wire = .405 -
Maximum current available = 66A

Power Supply in Switch Unit

Current output is less than the other listed faults. Current magnitude unknown, specifications not available.

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current output from these sources is limited to less than other sources listed.

For Pylon Mounted Missile

(1) Cable W6 Damaged

Wires to pins 20 and 60 shorted to 28VDC from CB1444, 118VAC from CB1394 if heater power is on, or guidance and logic signals.

CB1444 (15A) 28VDC Missile Electronic Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

58 ft of #20 wire = .11 ~-

switch = $.01 \triangle$

Maximum current available = 233A

CB1394 (10A) 118VAC Heater Power

Resistance of wire from CB to missile interface

58 ft of #12 wire = .. 11 ~~

switch = .01 \sim

Maximum current available = 983A

4.1.7.8b (Continued)

Guidance and Logic Signals

Current output from these sources is limited to less than other sources listed.

(2) Left Pylon MCU Damaged

Wires to pins 20 and 60 shorted to 27VDC from CB1483, \pm 22VDC from power supply in switch unit, or guidance and logic signals.

CB1483 (5A) 27VDC Essential Power

Resistance of wire from CB to MCU

50 ft of #20 wire = .619 ^

Maximum current available = 43.5A

Power Supply in Switch Unit

Current output less than other listed fault. Current magnitude unknown, specifications not available.

Guidance and Logic Signals


Current output from these sources is limited to less than other sources listed.

Note: All circuit breakers are located in the AGM-69A Power Distribution Box

4.1.7.8 (Continued)

c. Worst Case Paths


For Launcher Mounted Missile
Reference Path (1) Cable W1 Damaged



Time - Current rating exceeds 6000% rating of CB. The time will be less than .13 sec (300% rated).

For Pylon Mounted Missile

Reference path (1) Cable W6 Damaged



4.1.7.8c (Continued)

NOTE: CABLING AND CONNECTORS ARE SHOWN FOR MISSILE #1 MOUNTED IN THE LAUNCHER. FOR MISSILE MOUNTED ON THE LEFT PYLON:

W1 IS W6 P24 IS P15 P32 IS P32 J1 IS J1




FIGURE 4.1-65. CABLE DRAWING

4.2 POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS - FB-111A

This section describes the power and load analyses of monitor and control circuits leading to gravity weapons loaded on weapon station 3 pivot pylon and in RH weapons bay. These two weapons stations were picked as typical for all nuclear weapons stations and represent both the nearest and farthest station from the power sources. Potential worst case currents at weapon stations 4 and 5 would be slightly higher (approximately 12%) than those calculated for weapon station 3 due to differences in wire length. Figure 4.2-A is a simplified schematic diagram of the circuits to the Aircraft Monitor and Control - station program unit (AMAC SPU) interface connector. Numbers opposite the interface pins refer to circuit analysis packages in section 4.2.6 herein. Figure 4.2-B is an exploded view of an AMAC SPU, typical for all stations. Figure 4.2-C locates the pivot pylon weapon station AMAC SPU. Figure 4.2-D is a copy of Figure 1-8 from T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1 showing the circuitry to the pivot pylon weapons station. Note that the pins at the bottom of the diagram are the weapon interface pins. Figure 4.2-E locates the weapons bay AMAC SPU's. Figure 4.2-F shows weapons bay interface circuitry. Note that the pins at the bottom of the diagram interface with the weapon. The main difference between the -3 pivot pylon interface and -R right hand weapons bay interface is the presence of interconnect pins V and W at the pylon. See Appendix A for a list of all technical data utilized for the FB-111A-Power and Load Analysis.

4.2.1 SUMMARY

Power and load analyses of network trees generated by sneak circuit analysis are documented in section 4.2.6 below. Table 4.2-1A, sheets 1 and 2, provide a summary of the results.

4.2.2 CONDITIONS

The following conditions and exclusions are applicable to the FB-111A Analysis.

TABLE 4.2-1A Power and Load Analysis Results - FB-111/Station 3 (Sheet 1 of 2)

·	WEAPON				ENVIRONNE IT ANALYSIS RESULTS	ANALYSIS R	ESULTS		
	INTERFACE		NORMAL		ABNORYAL		WORST CASE	ANALYSIS PACKAGE	
DESIGNATOR	FUNCT TON	 	-	4	>	I	ţ	Section 4.2.6	1 1
J479013-3	WPN STATION 3							٠,	1
Pin A	SAFE INPUT	287	608A	.6s	28V	608A	.6s	4.2.6.2	
ဆပ	(NONE) SAFE INDICATION	287	48mA		288	608A	.65/-*	4.2.6.5	
O 111	(NONE) GROUNDED	0			I I DY AC	1 98m A			
¥ (5	GRUUNDED WPN PRESENT (GROUND)	28V	48mA		287	· 608A	*-/s9°.	4.2.6.5	٠
	ARM INPUT	00	00	 	115VAC 28V 28V	198mA 608A 608A	. 6s	4.2.6.2	
د . ،	(UNUSED) -		0		28V 115VAC	608A 451A	s9 [.] /s9·	4.2.6.3	
ΣZ	(NONE) (UNUSED)	0			287	608A	.6s/.6s	4.2.6.3	
a	PAL MONITOR	287	48mA		28V	608A	.65/.65	4.2.6.1	
~	ARM INDICATION	287	48mA		28V	608A	*-/s9·	4.2.6.5	
∾⊢:	SWITCHED TO GROUND (NONE)	0		<u> </u>	284	608A	. 6s	4.2.6.6	
2 > 3	PYLON CONTINUITY PYLON CONTINUITY	00			28V	608A	9	4.2.6.6	
:×>	WPN DROP CONFIG. RETARD	00	. o c		58A 58A	608A	. s. s	. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4.	
- 7	BURST OPTION-AIR	00			28A	608A	s s	4.2.6.2	
Ф .	SAFE PROVISION	28V	48m A	;	284 284	608A 608A	.6s/-*	4.2.6.4	
, o o	(SRAM ONLY) WPW DROP CONFIG. FREE		00		1 15VAC 28V 28V	198mA 608A 608A	.6s	4.2.6.3	
\$	(FUTURE CAPABILITY) BURST OPTION-GND	00	00		. 28V 28V	608A 608A	89.	4.2.6.2	
		*			•		,*Indefinite		

TABLE 4.2-1A Power and Load Analysis Results - FB-111/Station -R Weapon Interface (Sheet 2 of 2)

	ANALYSIS PACKAGE	Section 4.2.6		4.2.6.2	4.2.6.5	•	4.2.6.5	4.2.6.2	4.2.6.3	4.2.6.3	4.2.6.5	4.2.6.6		•	4.2.6.2	2.6.	4.2.6.	44	4.2.6.2
ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS		t		s9.	65		.6s	.6s	89.	3 99	. 68 . 68	100e1101te .6s	•	\$9.	89	. 6s	.6s indefinite		. 6s
				1333A 3286A	1333A		1333A 198mA	1333A 1333A	1333A 215A	1333A	1333A 1333A 1333A	1333A		1333A	1333A	1333A	1333A 198m A	1333A 1333A	1333A 1333A
	ABNORMAL	>		28V 115VAC	28V		28V	287 287 287	28V 115VAC	287	28V 28V	115VAC 28V		28A	28A 28A	287	28V 115VAC	28V 28V	28V 28V
	NORMAL	-		.6s	ť		:	1 1	;	:	11	:		;	1 1	, l	!	::	::
		-		1333A	48mA		48mA	00	0	0	48mA 48mA	o		00		0	48m8	00	00
		Λ	i	28V	287		. 782	00	0	0	28V 28V			00	0	0	284	00	00 ⁻
NEABON	INTERFACE	FUNCTION	RH WPNS BAY	SAFE INPUT	(NONE) SAFE INDICATION	(NONE) GROUHDED GROUHDED	WPN PRESENT (GND)	ARM INPUT ARM INPUT	(NONE) (UNUSED)	(NONE) (UNUSED)	PAL MONITOR ARM INDICATION	SWITCHED TO GND (NONE)	(NONE) (UNUSED IN WPN BAY) (UNISED IN WPN BAY)	ONFIG	RIEST OPTION-AIR		SAFE PROVISION	(SRAM ONLY) WPW DROP CONFIG-FF	
		DESIGNATOR	J479013-R	Pin A	ຂບ	_ w u	. <i>1</i>	エつ	メー	ΣZ	6- ∝	ν⊢	- D > 3	: × >	- ~	1 ro	، م	ິບ ູບ	0 %-




Figure 4.2-A Simplified Schematic - Circuits to AMAC SPU

T.O. 11N-T503G-2

Section II




Figure 2-2. Station Program Unit Exploded View

2-3

Figure 4.2-B Typical AMAC SPU

Section V

T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1





Figure 5-37. Pivot Pylon AMAC SPU and Nuclear Weapons Simulator Plug Removal and Installation 5-190

Figure 4.2-C Pivot Pylon AMAC SPU Location






Figure 4.2-D Weapon Station 3 Circuitry (Sheet 1 of 3)




Figure 4.2-D Weapon Station 3 Circuitry (Sheet 2 of 3)




Figure 4.2-D Weapon Station 3 Circuitry
(Sheet 3 of 3)
Figure 1-8. Stores Management System Pivot Pylon Integrated Schematic Diagram

Change 2 1-22

ry

4-146




Figure 5-36. Weapons Bay AMAC SPU and Nuclear Weapons Simulator Plug Removal and Installation 5-189

Figure 4.2-E Weapons Bay AMAC SPU Location




Figure 1-10. Stores Management System Weapons Bay Integrated Schematic

Figure 4.2-F Weapon Station R Circuitry (Sheet 1 of 4)




Figure 4.2-F Weapon Station R Circuitry (Sheet 2 of 4)




Figure 4.2-F Weapon Station R Circuitry (Sheet 3 of 4)

4-150




Figure 4.2-F Weapon Station R Circuitry (Sheet 4 of 4)

- O Interface with gravity bombs are the connectors shown in the aircraft wiring diagrams.
- O Analyses of abnormal environments are considered only one fault at a time.
- Wiring faults within aircraft wiring harnesses were limited to those within shared cables and connectors. Cable-to-cable and bundle-to-bundle wiring faults were excluded.
- Release circuits were not included as nuclear weapon interface circuits during load analysis for abnormal environments.
- O Short circuits in terminals and faults internal to components were not considered except in the worst-case abnormal environment analysis for each model.
- The abnormal environments analysis of the FB-111A escape capsule disconnects were limited to circuits related to nuclear weapons.
- O FB-111A SRAM interfaces were excluded.

4.2.3 IDENTITY OF CIRCUITS

The analysis used sneak circuit network trees and Air Force technical orders to identify adjacent and interrelated circuits for fault analysis. Network trees and other diagrams used to analyze the circuits are included in the individual analysis packages in section 4.2.6 of this report.

4.2.4 NORMAL ENVIRONMENT


Power capability of each interfacing circuit was calculated for open circuit voltage and short circuit current at the weapon interface.

4.2.5 ABNORMAL ENVIRONMENTS

Each network tree was analyzed for postulated faults. The faults are identified in the analysis package diagrams by numbered circles. In most instances, the worst case is a postulated short circuit at the point of lowest impedance. Worst case current and circuit breaker trip times have been calculated for each interfacing circuit.

4.2.5.1 GROUND RULES

Resistances across relays and trip times of circuit breakers have been selected from available data based on standard temperatures. On the ground, a temperature of +25°C is used. In flight, a temperature of -54°C is used for components outside the crew compartment. Components inside the crew compartment were assumed to be at +25°C. Most circuit breakers in this study are located outside the crew compartment. This accounts for the significantly longer trip times of faults postulated in flight. The following curve, based upon Texas Instrument data, and General Dynamic Circuit Breaker Standard C2697 were used to compute trip times.



TIME IN SECONDS

CB TRIP TIME VS CURRENT PROFILE

4.2.5.1 (Continued)


Circuits fed by TR (Transformer/Rectifier) power were assumed to carry 28 volts direct current. There are some faults to circuits carrying either 115 volts or 28 volts alternating current. In all cases, power profiles were found to be step functions, lasting until the circuit breaker trips. No current was found that was high enough to weld the circuit breaker closed, however some fault currents would be so low (mA) that they would remain indefinitely on cirucits protected against much higher currents.

4.2.6 CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGES

Normal and fault analyses are documented in individual packages for the circuit groups. The following analysis packages cover all of the gravity weapon interface circuits at stations 3 and R:


4.2.6.1	Pin P	Permissive Action Link Ground
4.2.6.2	Pins A,H,J,Y,X,Z, <u>d, e, f</u>	Arm/Safe Inputs, Burst Options, Plus Weapon Drop Config.
4.2.6.3	Pins L,N, a, c	Nuclear Weapons Control and SRAM Circuitry
4.2.6.4	Pin b	Master Power Distribution
4.2.6.5	Pin <u>b</u> Pins C,G,R	Monitor & Release Plus Option Selector & Monitor
4.2.6.6	Pins S,V,W	Station Select

Note: Power Profiles - In all cases the short circuit current was found to be either much less than the source circuit breaker ratings or much greater than the ratings. Where the current was much less than the rating the current will remain constant until the source is removed. Where the current is much greater, the current will remain constant until the circuit breaker trips. A typical profile of this case is shown below.



4.2.6.1 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interfaces Pin P of AMAC SPU-3 and -R (Weapon Station 3 Pylon and Weapon Station R Bay)

These interfaces are shown in Figure 4.2-D, which is a copy of Figure 1-8 from T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1 (Change 2) showing the circuitry to the pivot pylon weapon station AMAC SPU interfaces and Figure 4.2-F which is a copy of Figure 1-10 from T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1 (Change 2) showing the circuitry to L and R-Bay AMAC SPU interfaces. A generalized schematic highlighting pin P circuitry is attached below. Maximum current available to Pin P in a normal environment is $\underline{48}$ mA (direct current). Worst-case current at 28VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be $\underline{608}$ amps for weapon station 3 and $\underline{1333}$ amps for weapon station R. Worst case fault current at 115VAC would be $\underline{451}$ amps for a weapon station 3. No faulted AC current has been identified for weapon station R.



a. Normal Power and Loads Analysis

Reference Figure 4.2-1 Network Tree 334 and Monitor Relay Technical Data. From examination of network tree and the Monitor Relay Technical Data; J479013-P for any weapon station $V_{OC} = 28VDC$; $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{579} = \frac{48}{579} \text{ mA}$

b. Fault Analysis

Reference Figure 4.2-1 Network Tree 334, Figure 4.2-2 Fault Diagram Weapon Station 3 and Figure 4.2-3 Fault Diagram Weapon Station R. The following faults were postulated:


- Wiring Harness 247W2 Damaged
 Wires to pin P shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-1 for voltage sources.
- Nuclear Weapon Control Panel Damaged
 Wires to pin P shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-1 for voltage sources.
- Wiring Harness 247W3, 247W14, Wing-Fuselage Disconnect 301J10 or Wing Pylon 3 Disconnect J600-9 Damaged
 Wires to pin P shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-1 for voltage sources.
- Pylon 3 Wiring Harness 351Wl, 351W2, 354Wl, 354W2, or Wing Pylon

 Disconnect J613 Damaged (Worst Case -115VAC

 Wires to pin P shorted to 28VDC or 115V 400Hz. See Table 4.2-1 for voltage sources.
- Mires to pin P shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-1 for voltage sources.

Worst Case Path for Weapon Station 3 at 28VDC

Reference path 5 from paragraph b.




Total resistance at path = .046 -

 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$ $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.046} = \underline{608} A$

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54°C for circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25°C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.

d. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station 3 at 115V 400Hz

Reference path 4 from paragraph b.



Total resistance of path .255 ~


 $V_{OC} = 115V 400H_z$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{115}{.255} = 451 \text{ A}$

Time = Less than <u>.6</u> seconds at -54°C for circuit breaker to open On ground alert at 25°C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.

e. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station R

Reference path 5 from paragraph b.



Total resistance of path .021-2

 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.021} = \frac{1333}{} A$

Time = Less than <u>.6</u> seconds at -54°C for circuit breaker to open.

On ground alert at 25°C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.




Figure 4.2-1 NETWORK TREE 334




Figure 4.2-2 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3




Figure 4.2-3 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION R

TABLE 4.2-1
POTENTIAL FAULT POWER SOURCES

FIGURE INDICATOR	CIRCUIT BREAKER	POWER
1	CB8 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB11 (5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
2	CB8 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
3	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
4	CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1 CB20 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB21 (20A) UNIT 305A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
5	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1 **CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1 *CB36 (20A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC ESS BUS


^{*}Station R only

^{**}Station 3 only

AMAC SPU PINS A, H, J, Y, X, Z, d, e, & f CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.2.6.2 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pins A, H, J, Y, X, Z, d, e, f of AMAC SPU-3 and -R. (Weapon Station 3 Pylon and Weapon Station R Bay)

These interfaces are shown in Figure 4.2-D, which is a copy of Figure 1-8 from T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1 (Change 2) showing the circuitry to the pivot pylon weapon station AMAC SPU interfaces and Figure 4.2-F which is a copy of Figure 1-10 from T.O. IF-111(B)A-2-11-1 (Change 2) showing the circuitry to L and R-Bay AMAC SPU interfaces. A simplified general schematic is attached below. Maximum current available to pin A in a normal environment is 608 amps (direct current) at Weapon Station 3 and 1333 amps at Weapon Station R. Maximum Current available to pins H, J, Y, X, Z, d, e and f in a normal environment for weapons station 3 and R is 0 amps. Worst case current at 28VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be 608 amps at Weapon Station 3 and 1333 amps at Weapon Station R for all the subject interface pins. Worst case fault current at 115VAC would be 1983 amps at pin A for Weapon Station 3 and 3286 amps at pin A for Weapon Station R. No faulted AC current has been identified for pins H, J, Y, X, Z, d, e and f of Weapon Station 3 or Weapon Station R.



a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

Reference Figure 4.2-4 Network Tree 365 and Figure 4.2-5 Network Tree 300. Relays K7 and K8 in the AMAC SPU can be energized by selecting Monitor and Safe options respectively on the Monitor and Control switch on the Nuclear Weapons Control Panel. From examination of the network trees: J479013 A weapon station 3

$$V_{OC} = 28VDC$$

$$I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.046}$$
 * = 608 A

*Wire resistance from CB to weapon interface

J479013-A weapon station R

$$V_{OC} = 28VDC$$

$$I_{SC} = \frac{28V}{.021} * = \frac{1333A}{}$$

*Wire resistance from CB to weapon interface

Actual current is assumed to be something less than 20 amps, the rating of the 28VDC circuit breaker.

J479013-H, J, X, Y, Z, d, e, f for all weapon stations

$$V_{OC} = OV$$

$$I_{SC} = OA$$

b. Fault Analysis

Reference Figure 4.2-4 Network Tree 365, Figure 4.2-5 Network Tree 300, Figure 4.2-6 Fault Diagram Weapon Station 3 and Figure 4.2-7 Fault Diagram Weapon Station R. The following postulated faults were analyzed.

(1) Wiring Harness 003W5 Damaged

Wires to pin A (assuming K7 or K8 in the AMAC SPU are energized) shorted to 28VDC or 115V 400 $H_{\rm Z}$. See Table 4.2-2 for voltage sources.

(2) Wiring Harness 003W14 Damaged

Wires to pin A (assuming either K7 or K8 in the AMAC SPU energized) shorted to 28VDC or 115V $400H_Z$. See Table 4.2-2 for voltage sources.

3 Connector 309J15 Damaged

Wires to pin A (assuming either K7 or K8 energized in the AMAC SPU) shorted to 28VDC from CB38 unit 304Al. See Table 4.2-2 for voltage source.

Pylon 3 Wiring Harness 351W1, 351W2, 354W1, 354W2 or Wing Pylon

Disconnect J613 Damaged

Wires to pin A (assuming either K7 or K8 energized in the AMAC SPU) shorted to 28VDC or 115V $400H_7$. See Table 4.2-2 for voltage sources.

(5) AMAC SPU Damaged


Wires to pins A, H, J, Y, X, Z, d, e, f shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-2 for voltage sources.

6 Power Panel Disconnect P27 Damaged

Wires to pin A (assuming either K7 or K8 energized in the AMAC SPU) shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-2 for voltage sources.

c. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station 3 at 28VDC

Reference path 5 from paragraph b.



J479013-A (Typical for H, J, X, Y, Z, d, e, f)

Total resistance at path = .046 -


 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.046} = \frac{608A}{}$

Time = Less than $\underline{.6}$ seconds at -54°C for circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25°C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.

d. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station 3 at 115V 400 Hz

Reference path 1) from paragraph b.



J479013-A

Total resistance of path = .058 __


 $V_{OC} = 115V 400 H_z$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{115}{.058} = \frac{1983}{} A$

Time = Less than <u>.6</u> seconds at -54°C for circuit breaker to open.

On ground alert at 25°C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.

e. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station R at 28VDC Reference path 5 from paragraph b.



J479013-A (Typical for H, J, X, Y, Z, d, e, f)

Total resistance of path = .021___

V_{OC} = 28VDC

 $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{021} = \frac{1333}{1} A$


Time = Less than <u>.6</u> seconds at -54°C for circuit breaker to open.

On ground alert at 25°C the time to open would be less than

.35 seconds.

f: Worst Case Path for Weapon Station R at 115V 400 H,

Reference path 1 from paragraph b.



Total resistance at path = .035___

 $V_{OC} = 115V 400 H_{z}$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{115}{.035} = \frac{3286}{} A$

Time = Less than $\underline{.6}$ seconds at -54°C for circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25°C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.




Figure 4.2-4 NETWORK TREE 365




Figure 4.2-5 NETWORK TREE 300




Figure 4.2-6 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3




Figure 4.2-7 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION R

TABLE 4.2-2
POTENTIAL FAULT POWER SOURCES

FIGURE INDICATOR	CIRCUIT BREAKER	POWER
	CB16 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB17 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB18 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB19 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB20 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB21 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB21 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB22 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB23 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB24 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB26 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB32 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB31 (15A) UNIT 305A1 CB11 (15A) UNIT 315A1 CB14 (15A) UNIT 315A1 CB15 (15A) UNIT 315A1 CB16 (35A) UNIT 315A1 CB10 (35A) UNIT 315A1 CB11 (35A) UNIT 315A1 CB12 (35A) UNIT 315A1 CB13 (35A) UNIT 315A1 CB14 (20A) UNIT 315A1 CB30 (35A) UNIT 304A1 CB36 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB37 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB37 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 **CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1 **CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1	115V 400Hz R MAIN BUS 115V 400Hz R MAIN BUS 115V 400Hz R MAIN BUS 115V 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115V 400Hz R MAIN BUS 115V 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115V 400Hz L MAIN BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
2	CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB12 (35A) UNIT 315A1 CB41 (10A) UNIT 315A1 CB19 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB20 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB21 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB22 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB32 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB33 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB33 (20A) UNIT 305A1	28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 115V 400Hz L MAIN BUS

TABLE 4.2-2 (Continued)
POTENTIAL FAULT POWER SOURCES

FIGURE INDICATOR	CIRCUIT BREAKER	POWER
3	CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC ESS BUS
4	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT CB10 (5A) UNIT CB12 (35A) UNIT CB20 (20A) UNIT CB21 (20A) UNIT CB22 (20A) UNIT	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 115V 400H _Z ØA L MAIN BUS 115V 400H _Z ØB L MAIN BUS 115V 400H _Z ØC L MAIN BUS
. (5)	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1 *CB36 (20A) UNIT 304A1 **CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1	
<u>6</u>	**CB36 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB37 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 *CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS . 28VDC ESS BUS


^{*} STATION R ONLY

^{**} STATION 3 ONLY

. AMAC SPU PINS L, N, a, c CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.2.6.3 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pins L, N, a, c of AMAC SPU-3 and -R (Weapon Station 3 Pylon and Weapon Station R Bay)

These interfaces are shown in Figures 4.2-8 through 4.2-10 Sneak Circuits Network Tree 352, T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14 and T.O. 11N-T5036-2. Maximum current and voltage to all of these interfaces in a normal environment is $\underline{0}$. This is because the wiring to pins L and N dead ends at the Nuclear Weapons Control Panel and the wiring to pins a and c is connected to SRAM circuitry and is not used for gravity weapons. Worst case current, at 28VDC in an abnormal faulted environment and assuming a ground at the weapon interface is $\underline{608}$ amps for weapon station 3 and $\underline{1333}$ amps for weapon station R. Norst case fault current at 115VAC would be $\underline{451}$ amps at weapon station 3, as L and N and $\underline{215}$ amps at weapon station R pins L and N.



a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

Reference Figures 4.2-8, 4.2-9, 4.2-10, Network Trees 352, 354, 355, 356.

From examination of network trees in Figure 4.2-10 for pins L and N at any weapon station

$$V_{0C} = \underline{0} V$$

$$I_{SC} = \underline{0} A$$

From examination of network trees in Figures 4.2-8 and 4.2-9 for pins a and c at any weapon station.

$$V_{OC} = \underline{O} V$$
 $I_{SC} = \underline{O} A$

Since relay K3 can only be energized if a SRAM is installed.

b. Fault Analysis

Reference Figures 4.2-8, 4.2-9 and 4.2-10, Network Trees 352, 354, 355, and 356 and Figure 4.2-11 Fault Diagram Weapon Station 3 and Figure 4.2-12 Fault Diagram Weapon Station R.

Since the wiring to pins L, N, a, and c are bussed to all nuclear weapons stations, any 28VDC or 115V 400 Hz power that might fault into these circuits for any weapon station will propagate to all weapon stations.

- Wiring Harness 247 W2 Damaged
 Wires to pin L or N shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-3 for voltage sources.
- Wiring Harness 247 W3 Damaged
 Wires to pin L or N shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-3 for voltage sources.

b. Fault Analysis (Continued)

- Wiring Harness 247 W14, 247 W15, Wing Fuselage


 Disconnect 308J13, 308J14, 309J13, 309J14 or Pylon 3, 4, 5, or
 6 Wing Pylon Disconnect Damaged.

 Wires to pin L or N shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-3 for voltage sources.
- Pylon 3, 4, 5, 6 Wiring Harness 351 W1, 351 W2, 354 W1
 354 W2 or Pylon Disconnect J613 Damaged

 Wires to pin L or N shorted to 28VDC or 115V 400Hz. See Table 4.2-3 for voltage sources.
- 5 AMAC SPU Damaged

Wires to pin L, N, a, c shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-3 for voltage sources.

c. <u>Norst Case Path for Weapon Station 3 at 28VDC</u>
Reference path(5) from paragraph b.



J479013/L (Typical for N, a, c)


Total resistance of path = .046 ohms

$$V_{OC} = 28VDC$$

$$I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.046} = \frac{608}{.046}$$
 amps

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54° C for circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25° C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.

- 4.2.6.3 (Continued)
- d. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station 3 at 115V 400Hz Pins L and N Reference path 4 from paragraph b.



J479013/L (Typical for N)

Total resistance of path = .255 ohms


 $V_{OC} = 115V 400Hz$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{115}{.255} = 451$ amps

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54° C for circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25° C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.

e. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station R at 28VDC

Reference path(5)from paragraph b.



J479013/L (Typical for N, a, c)

Total resistance of path = .021 ohms


 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.021} = 1333$ amps

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54° C for the circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25° C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds

f. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station R for 115V, 400Hz at Pins L and N

Reference path 4 from paragraph b.




Typical for N

Total resistance of path = .535 ohms

 $V_{OC} = 115V 400Hz$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{115}{.535} = 215$ amps

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54° C for circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25° C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.



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SNEAK CIRCUITS NETWORK TREE




FIGURE 4.2-10. METWORK TREES 355 AND 356




FIGURE 4.2-11. FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3




FIGURE 4.2-12. FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION R

TABLE 4,2-3
POTENTIAL FAULT POWER SOURCES


FIGURE INDICATO	R CIRCUIT BREAKER	POWER
1	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
2 3	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
. 4	CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1 (CB20 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB21 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB22 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB12 (35A) UNIT 315A1 (CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1 (CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 (CB29 (35A) UNIT 315A1 (CB19 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB32 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB33 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB35 (20A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS
	CB13 (35A) UNIT 315A1 CB16 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB17 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB18 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB34 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB30 (35A) UNIT 315A1 CB26 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB24 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB23 (20A) UNIT 305A1	115VAC, 400HZ R MAIN BUS 28 VDC ESS BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400HZ, R MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400HZ, R MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400HZ, R MAIN BUS
. 5	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1 CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB36 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB37 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB35 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB34 (20A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
R> STA R ONLY 6> STA 6 ONLY	STA L ONLY 3> STA 3 4> STA 4 ONLY	ONLY STA 5 ONLY

D2-118576 -1 AMAC SPU PIN <u>b</u>

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE


4.2.6.4 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pin <u>b</u> of AMAC SPU-3 and -R (Weapon Station 3 Pylon and Weapon Station R-Bay)

These interfaces are shown in Figure 4.2-13 Sneak Circuits Network Tree 318, Figure 4.2-D, which is a copy of Figure 1-8 from T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1 (Change 2) showing the circuitry to the pivot pylon weapon station AMAC SPU interfaces and Figure 4.2-F which is a copy of Figure 1-10 from T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1 (Change 2) showing the circuitry to L and R-Bay AMAC SPU interfaces. Maximum current available to the interfaces in a normal environment is 48 mA (direct current). Worst case current at 28VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be 608 amps for weapon station 3 and 1333 amps for weapon station R. Worst case fault current at 115VAC would be 198 mA for weapon station 3 and R.



c. Worst Case Path For Weapon Station 3 at 28VDC

Reference: Path 5 from paragraph b.



Total resistance of path = .046 -


 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$

 $^{\rm I}$ SC = $\frac{28}{.046}$ = $\frac{608}{.046}$ A

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54° C for circuit breaker to open. On ground alert the time to open would be less than .35 seconds at 25° C.

d. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station 3 At 115V 400Hz

Reference path 4 from paragraph b.



Total resistance of path ≈ 580 ~


 $V_{OC} = 115V 400Hz$

 $^{\rm I}$ SC = $\frac{115}{580}$ = $\frac{198}{580}$ mA

Per telecon with relay manufacturer, Leach, the thermistor and varistor inside the relay will probably open at this voltage causing a net increase in resistance. At 25°C this is 800 \sim resulting in an I_{SC} of 144 mA.

e. Worst Case Path For Weapon Station R At 28VDC

Reference path 5 from paragraph b.



Total resistance of path = .021 ~

 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$


 $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.021} = \underline{1333} \text{ A}$

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54°C for circuit breaker to open.

On ground alert the time to open would be less than .35 seconds at 25°C.

f. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station R at 115V 400Hz

Reference path 4 from paragraph b.



Total resistance of path ≈ 580 ...

 $V_{OC} = 115V 400 Hz$ $I_{SC} = \frac{115}{580} = \underline{198} \text{ mA}$

Per telecon with relay manufacturer, Leach, the thermistor and varistor inside the relay will probably open at this voltage causing a net increase in resistance. At 25°C this would be 800 \sim resulting in an I_{SC} of 144 mA.

FIGURE 4.2-13. NETWORK TREE 318




FIGURE 4.2-14 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3
4-197




FIGURE 4.2-15 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION R

TABLE 4.2-4
POTENTIAL FAULT POWER SOURCES

FIGURE INDICATOR	CIRCUIT BREAKER	POWER · · ·
1	CB8 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB11 (5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
23	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
4	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1 (CB20 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB21 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB21 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB12 (35A) UNIT 305A1 (CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1 (CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 (CB29 (35A) UNIT 305A1 (CB19 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB32 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB33 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB33 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB13 (35A) UNIT 305A1 (CB16 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB17 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB17 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB18 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB30 (35A) UNIT 305A1 (CB30 (35A) UNIT 305A1 (CB24 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB24 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB23 (20A) UNIT 305A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz R MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz R MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz R MAIN BUS 28 VDC ESS BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz R MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz R MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz, R MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz, R MAIN BUS
5	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1 CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB36 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB37 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB35 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB34 (20A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
6	CB8 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
R STA R ONLY 6 STA 6 ONLY	STA L ONLY 3> S STA 4 ONLY 4-199	STA 3 ONLY SSTA 5 ONLY


AMAC SPU PINS

C. G. R

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.2.6.5 Circuit Analysis Package, Weapon Interface Pins C, G, R of AMAC-SPU-3 and -R (Weapon Station 3 Pylon and Weapon Station R Bay)

These interfaces are shown in Figure 4.2-16 and 4.2-17 Sneak Circuits Network Tree, Figure 4.2-D, which is a copy of Figure 1-8 from T.O. 1F-111(B) A-2-11-1 (Change 2) showing the circuitry to the pivot pylon weapon station AMAC SPU interfaces and Figure 4.2-F which is a copy of Figure 1-10 from T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1 (Change 2) showing the circuitry to L and R-Bay AMAC SPU interfaces. Maximum current available to the interfaces in a normal environment is 48 mA (direct current). Worst case current at 28VDC in an abnormal (faulted) environment would be 608 amps for weapon station 3 and 1333 amps for weapon station R. Worst case fault current at 115VAC would be 198 mA for weapon station 3 and R.



a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

Reference: Figures 4.2-16 and 4.2-17 Network Tree 1, Figure 4.2-18 Network Tree 334, Monitor-Relay Technical Data

From examination of the network tree

 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{579} = 48$ mA for pin G

 $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{579} = \frac{48}{579}$ mA for pins R&C when the Option Select switch on the Nuclear Weapons Control Panel is in any position except off.

b. Fault Analysis

Reference: Figure 4.2-16 and 4.2-17 Network Tree 1, Figure 4.2-18 Network Tree 334, Figure 4.2-19 Fault Diagram for Weapon Station 3 and Figure 4.2-20 Fault Diagram for Weapon Station R.

Since the wiring to pins C, G, and R is bussed to all nuclear weapons stations any 28VDC or 115V 400Hz power that might fault into these circuits for any weapon station will propagate to all weapon stations.

- Wiring Harness 247 W2 Damaged
 Wires to pin C or R shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-5 for voltage sources.
- Wiring Harness 247 W3 Damaged Wires to pin C, G or R shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-5 for voltage sources.
- Wiring Harness 247 W14, 247 W15, Wing Fuselage
 Disconnect 308 J13, 308 J14, 309 J13, 309 J14 or Pylon 3, 4,
 5, or 6 Wing-Pylon Disconnect Damaged

Wires to pin C, G, or R shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-5 for voltage sources.

- b. (Continued)
 - Pylon 3, 4, 5, 6 Wiring Harness 351 W1, 351 W2, 354 W1, 354 W2


 or Pylon Disconnect J613 Damaged

 Wires to pin C, G, or R shorted to 28VDC or 115V 400 Hz. See

 Table 4.2-5 for voltage sources.
 - Mires to pin C, G, or R shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-5 for voltage sources.
 - Muclear Weapons Control Panel Damaged
 Wires to pin C or R shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-5 for voltage sources.

c. Worst Case Path For Weapon Station 3 at 28 VDC

Reference path(5)from paragraph b.



J479013/C (Typical for G and R)


Total resistance of path = .046 Ω

 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$ $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.046} = \underline{608} A$

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54° C for circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25°C, the time to open would be less than35 seconds.

d. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station 3 at 115V 400Hz

Reference path 4 from paragraph b.



J479013/C (Typical for G and R)

Total resistance of path ≈ 580 _~


 $V_{OC} = \frac{115V}{115} = \frac{400Hz}{198 \text{ mA}}$

Per telecon with relay manufacturer, Leach, the thermistor and varistor inside the relay will probably open at this voltage causing a net increase in resistance. At 25°C this is 800 ohms resulting in an I_{SC} of 144 mA.

(Continued) 4.2.6.5

Worst Case Path for Weapon Station R at 28VDC

Reference path 5) from paragraph b.



J479013/C (Typical for R and C)


Total resistance of path = .021 ____

 $V_{OC} = \frac{28}{28} = \frac{1333}{100} A$

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54° C for circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25°C, the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.

f. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station R at 115V 400Hz

Reference path 4 from paragraph b.



Typical for G and R

Total resistance of path approximately 580 ohms

 $V_{OC} = 115V 400Hz$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{115}{580} = \underline{198} \text{ mA}$

Per telecon with relay manufacturer, Leach, the thermistor and varistor inside the relay will probably open at this voltage causing a net increase in resistance. At 25° C this would be approximately 800 ohms resulting in an I_{SC} of 144 mA.




FIGURE 4.2-16 NETWORK TREE/STATION 3





FIGURE 4.2-17 NETWORK TREE/STATION R

•



NETWORK TREE 334 FIGURE 4.2-18




FIGURE 4.2-19 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3
4-210




FIGURE 4.2-20 FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION R


TABLE 4.2-5
POTENTIAL FAULT POWER SOURCES

FIGURE INDICATOR	R CIRCUIT BREAKER	POWER
1	CB8 (7.5A) UHIT 314A1 CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB11 (5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
23	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
4	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1 (CB20 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB21 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB22 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB12 (35A) UNIT 315A1 (CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1 (CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 (CB29 (35A) UNIT 315A1	
	CB19 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB32 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB33 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB35 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB13 (35A) UNIT 315A1 CB16 (20A) UNIT 305A1 CB17 (20A) UNIT 305A1	115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 115VAC 400Hz L MAIN BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz R MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz R MAIN BUS
	CB18 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB34 (20A) UNIT 304A1 (CB30 (35A) UNIT 315A1 (CB26 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB24 (20A) UNIT 305A1 (CB23 (20A) UNIT 305A1	115VAC, 400Hz R MAIN BUS 28 VDC ESS BUS 28VDC MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz, R MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz, R MAIN BUS 115VAC, 400Hz, R MAIN BUS
. (5)	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1 CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB36 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB37 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB38 (20A) UNIT 304A1 CB34 (20A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
6	CB8 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS
R STA R ONLY STA 6 ONLY	STA 4 ONLY 3> ST	A 3 ONLY 5> STA 5 ONLY

D2-118576:-1 AMAC SPU PINS S, V, W CIRCUIT ANALYSIS PACKAGE

4.2.6.6 Circuit Analysis Package Weapon Interface Pins S, V and W of AMAC SPU-3 and -R (Weapon Station 3 Pylon and Weapon Station R Bay)

These interfaces are shown in Figures 4.2-21 and 4.2-22 Sneak Circuit Network Trees 364 and 360, Figure 4.2-D, which is a copy of Figure 1-8 from T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1 (Change 2) showing the circuitry to the pivot pylon weapon station AMAC SPU interfaces and Figure 4.2-F which is a copy of Figure 1-10 from T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1 (Change 2) showing the circuitry to L and R-Bay AMAC SPU interfaces. Maximum current and voltage to pin S interface in a normal environment is O. Current and voltage to pins V and W in a normal environment is controlled by the weapon itself. Worst case current at 28VDC in an abnormal faulted environment is 608 amps for Pins S, V and W for weapon station 3. Worst case fault current at 28VDC for weapon station R is 1333 amps at pin S.



a. Normal Power and Load Analysis

Pin S

Reference figures 4.2-21 and 4.2-22 Network Trees 364 and 360. Relay K12 in the AMAC SPU is only energized when an arming function is being commanded. From inspection of the network trees

$$V_{0C} = 0 V$$

$$I_{SC} = 0 A$$

Pins V and W

Reference Figure 4.2-23 Fault Diagram for Weapon Station 3
Pins V and W are connected only to each other only in the pylon
AMAC SPU's. Thus the power is determined by the weapon circuitry.

b. Fault Analysis


Reference Figure 4.2-21 Network Tree 364, Figure 4.2-22 Network Tree 360, Figure 4.2-23 Fault Diagram Weapon Station 3 and Figure 4.2-24 Fault Diagram Weapon Station - R.

1) AMAC SPU Damaged

Wires to subject pins shorted to 28VDC. See Table 4.2-6 for the voltage sources. Since pin S is switching a ground into the weapon and K12 is only energized by an arming command the worst case fault could be relay K12 damaged such that the contacts are shorted or wires to pin S shorted to ground.

c. Worst Case Path for Weapon Station 3

Reference path 1) from paragraph b.



For maximum current calculations only one pin at a time is assumed grounded at the weapon interface.

Total resistance of each path = .046 -


$$V_{OC} = 28VDC$$

Pin S

$$I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.046} = \underline{608} \text{ A}$$

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54° C for the circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25° C the time to open would be less than .35 seconds.

d. Worst Case Path For Weapon Station R Reference path 1 from paragraph b.



Total resistance at path = .021_.


 $V_{OC} = 28VDC$

 $I_{SC} = \frac{28}{.021} = \frac{1333A}{}$

Time = Less than .6 seconds at -54° C for the circuit breaker to open. On ground alert at 25° C the time for the circuit breaker to open would be less than .35 seconds.

SNEAK CIRCUITS NETWORK TREE

REV



"AMAC-3 SPU STATION SELECT" PICKS UP KIZ AND SWITCHES AND INTO WEAPON WHON "OPTION SELECT" SWY. IS IN AN "ARM" POSITION AND "NUCLEAR CONSENT" SWX. IS IN "ARM of PEREASE" POSITION.

O Potential Fault Sources

See Fig 4.2- for interface areas
and Table 4.2-6 for source descriptions


Interface point for
adjacent circuitry

ROJECT	шА	AMAC-3 "STATION 3 SOLGET"	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
QC	DATE	ANALYST DATE 9-18-75 NODAL SET	364
HOU-705		BBEILISE ALBERTACE CLASSASIT - HOUSTON, TEXAS	

FIGURE 4.2-21. , NETWORK TREE 364

SNEAK CIRCUITS NETWORK TREE

RE\



"AMAC-R SPU STATION SELECT" DICUS UP KIZ AND SWITCHES AND INTO WEAPON WHEN "OPTION SELECT" SWX. IS IN AN "ARM" POSITION AND "NUCLEAR CONSENT" SWX. IS IN "ARM & RELEASE" POSITION.

Potential Fault Sources

See Fig 4.2- for interface areas

And Table 4.2-6 for source descriptions

- Interface point for adjacent circuitry

PBILIA		TITLE	AMAC-R "STATION R SCHEET"					
QC	DATE	A	NALYST	DATE	9-18-75	NODAL	SET	360

FIGURE 4.2-22. NETWORK TREE 360 ·




FIGURE 4.2-23. FAULT DIAGRAM WEAPON STATION 3




FIGURE 4.2-24. FAULT DIAGRAM NEAPONS STATION R
4-220

TABLE 4.2-6

FIGURE INDICATOR	CIRCUIT BREAKER	POWER
①	CB9 (7.5A) UNIT 314A1 CB10 (5A) UNIT 304A1 *CB36 (20A) UNIT 304A1 **CB39 (20A) UNIT 304A1	28VDC CREW STA ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS 28VDC ESS BUS

*STATION R ONLY
**STATION 3 ONLY

4.3 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

Boeing performed a system safety analysis of B-52 accident data as part of the power and load analysis.

4.3.1 Purpose

The purpose of the accident analysis was to provide generalized electrical damage modes and to determine the conditions under which they are feasible. The goal was to define the abnormal environments in terms of electrical faults that could be reasonably postulated for the power and load analysis of any aircraft.

4.3.2 Source Data

Boeing-Wichita supported this effort by providing data on eleven B-52 aircraft accidents and two incidents where damage to electrical wiring was documented or where nuclear weapons were known to have been carried. Four accidents (Cases 1, 2, 4 and 8) are known to have involved aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons. None of these weapons was detonated. The source material does not show that any stray power actually reached the weapon interfaces and Boeing investigators are unaware of any such findings. It is believed that all instances of weapons departing the aircraft involved structural failure due to inflight breakups and violent gyrations. Two taxi accidents (Cases 3 and 13) involved collision with the inboard external stores station. Damage would probably have been the same if other aircraft or large vehicles had struck parked B-52 aircraft. There are two instances of wheel well fire due to tire or hydraulic line failure (Cases 10 and 12). Other feasible locations for fire are crew compartment spaces where gear can be improperly stowed (Case 2); electrical equipment compartments (Case 7) or connectors exposed to excessive moisture (Case 6). Disintegrating engine components are feasible sources of shrapnel damage (Case 11) to electrical circuitry. Table 4.3-1 is a summary of the source data.

TABLE 4.3-1 CRASH/FIRE JAMAGE-SOURCE DATA

REMARKS	Was armed with nuclear weapons	Was armed with nuclear weapons		Was armed with four nuclear weapons	•			Was armed with nuclear weapons					GAM-77 penetrated nose of KC-135
LOCATION	Goldsboro, N.C.	Thule, Greenland	Plattsburgh, AFB	SE Coast of Spain	Wright Patterson AFB	New Hampshire	California	Cumberland, Md.	Larson AFB, Washington	Kadena AFB, Okinawa	Pease AFB, N.H.	Barksdale AFB, Louisiana	Columbus AFB, Mississippi
DATE	1-23-61	1-21-68	7-30-63	1-17-66	6-3-74	11-20-68	12-10-70	1-13-64	12-15-60	11-3-68	11-11-66	8-6-62	1-31-64
AIRCRAFT IDENTITY	B-52G 58-187	B-52G 58-188	B-52G 58-197	8-526 58-256	В-52Н 60-006	B-52C 54-2671	B-52F 57-154	B-52D 55-060	B-52D 55-098	B-52D 55-115	8-520 56-606	B-52F 57-053	B-52F ,57-139
DESCRIPTION	Wing Skin Failed during air refueling	Fire in rear of crew compartment lower deck	Taxi collision with parked KC-97 tankers	Mid-air collision with KC-135 tanker	Separation of forward fuselage due to hard nose gear landing	Electrical fire in connector due to moisture	ALT/6B Power Supply fire	Structural breakup due to exceeding 80° bank angle in turbu- lence	Mid-air collision with tanker. Wing failed upon landing	Brake fire	LH inboard engine starter disintegrated	Hydraulic/electrical fire from blown tire damage	Collision with parked KC-135
CASE NO.	_	2	က	4	ഗ	Ø	7	œ	6	10	11	12	13

4.3.4 Crash/Fire Damage Analysis

The damage analysis shows that electrical faults in abnormal environments are usually caused by structural breakups, fire or both. Damage mechanisms are either excessive physical forces, or high temperatures. In summary, the principle causes of damages to electrical circuits are:

- O CRASH DUE TO COLLISION OR STRUCTURAL BREAKUP
- o FIRE DUE TO:

CRASH

TIRE/HYDRAULIC FAILURE

ELECTRICAL FAILURE

IMPROPER STOWAGE

Table 4.3-2 shows the causes and effects of electrical damage for the cases selected from the source data.

4.3.4 Findings

The accident analysis found that almost any electrical fault mode is feasible under conditions of crash or fire. This includes opens, shorts to power and shorts to ground. These faults can occur in wiring, components or equipment assemblies. The most likely locations are leading edges of wings and struts, wheel well areas, equipment bays and crew compartments. There is at least one instance where 'eapons bay components were probably damaged during initial breakup. These findings are shown in Table 4.3-3.


	•	`	D2-	-118576" -1	•		•
PRIMARY LOCATION	ALL INBOARD WING WIRING.	CREM COMPARTHENT.	INBOARD LEADING EDGE AT EXTERNAL STORES MOUNT.	WEAPONS BAY IN FUSELAGE.	BODY PRODUCTION BREAK BULK- HEAD FORWARD OF WING CENTER SECTION.	FORMARD RADOME PRESSURIZED BULKHEAD.	CREW COMPARTMENT EQUIP-
ELECTRICAL FAULT(S)	ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES FAULTED OPEN. ALL EQUIPMENT FAULTED TO GRÖUND. ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES SHORTED TOGETHER.	ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES SHORTED TOGETHER.	ADJACENT WIRES SHORTED TOGETHER. ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES FAULTED OPEN OR SHORTED TO COMMON GROUND.	ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES FAULTED OPEN. ADJACENT BUNDLES SHORTED TO COMMON GROUND. ALL EQUIPMENT SHORTED TO GROUND. ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES SHORTED TOGETHER.	ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES FAULTED OPEN. ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES SHORTED TO COMMON GROUND.	SHORT CIRCUITS BETWEEN ADJACENT PINS.	LOSS OF POWER TO CIR- CUITS FED BY TRANS- FORMER. SHORT CIRCUITS, OPENS AND SHORTS TO GROUND ON WIRING IN AREA.
ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT EFFECT(S)	MIRE BUNDLES SEVERED OPEN, AND GROUNDED TO STRUCTURE. COMPONENTS CRUSHED MIRE BUNDLES MELTED TOGETHER.	CHARRED INSULATION IN WIRE BUNDLES.	CRUSHED AND SEVERED HIRING.	MIRE BUNDLES SEVERED OPEN, AND GROUNDED TO STRUCTURE. COMPONENTS CRUSHED. MIRES PINCHED TOGETHER. MIRE BUNDLES MELTED TOGETHER.	WIRE BUNDLES: SEVERED OPEN AND GROUNDED TO STRUCTURE.	CRACKED INSULATORS BETWEEN PINS IN BULKHEAD CONNECTORS.	BADLY BURNED TRANS- FORMER. (EXPLOSION SEVERED STEERING CABLE LINKAGE. ELECTRICAL WIRING COULD HAVE BEEN SEVERED OR CRUSHED).
DAMAGE MECHANISM	TERSION ON WING WIRING FOLLOWED BY VIOLENT INERIAL FORCES, IMPACT WITH GROUND AND FIRE.	HEAT FROM FIRE INTEN- SIFIED BY AIR BLAST AFTER ESCAPE HATCH JETTISONEO.	IMPACT FORCES	VIOLENT FORCES DUE TO IMPACT, INERTIA, GRAVITY AND MIND, FOLLOWED BY INTENSE FIRE, GROUND IMPACT AND FUEL-FED GROUND FIRES.	SUDDEN TENSILE IMPACT LOADS ON WIRING.	HEAT AND ARCING.	EXPLOSION OF POWER SUP- PLY FOLLOWED BY ELECT- RICAL FIRE.
CAUSE	STRUCTURAL BREAKUP OF RIGHT HAND WING.	FOAM RUBBER SEAT CUSHION STOWED ON NAVIGATOR'S HOT AIR SPRAY TUBE UNDER SEAT.	COLLISION WITH . PARKED AIRCRAFT DUE TO BRAKE FAILURE.	BREAKUP OF FUSELAGE AT FORMARD BOMB BAY DUE TO COLLISION WITH TANKER, FOL- LOWED BY SPIN AND IN-FLIGHT FIRE, ERDING WITH SCAT- TERED GROUND IM-	FORWARD FUSELAGE SEPARATED FROM REST OF AIRCRAFT OW INITIAL FRONT GEAR IMPACT DUE TO FAILURE TO FLARE	LOWER NOSE RADOME ELECTRICAL FIRE CAUSED BY ELECTRI- CAL SHORT IN CONNECTOR DUE TO MOISTURE IN THE	MATERIAL FAILURE OF TRANSFORMER IN POWER SUPPLY PANEL.
ABNORVAL ENVIRONMENT	CRASH/FIRE	FIRE	CRASH	CRASH/FIRE	СРАЅН	FIRE	FIRE .
OPERATIONAL MODE	FLIGHT - REFUELING/ PRELANDING CHECKS	FLIGHT- CRUISE	GROUND- TAXI	FL IGHT- Refuel Ing	FL 1GHT- LANDING	FLIGHT - LANDING APPROACH	FLIGHT- CRUISE
CASE NO.	1	2	ri.	4-225	ம் ம	v	7.

TABLE 4.3-2 CRASH/FIRE DAMAGE ANALYSI

1	SE- UITRY	6		D2-11857	76 - 1	1 W	•	•
PRIMARY LOCATION	WING AND AFT FUSE- (NO WEAPON CIRCUITRY	ING ROOT LEAD-	WHEEL WELL	INDOARD WING LEADING EDGE	MAIN GEAR WIEEL WELL	APS. CREW COCK. LEADING EDGE L STORES TRUCTURE		
	OUTER WIN	INBOARD WING ING EDGE	MAIN GEAR WHEEL	INBOARD W.	MAIN GEAR	LOWER FORMARS CREW PARTMENT & LEADING OF EXTENAL STORES MOUNTING STRUCTURE		
ELECTRICAL FAULT(S)	ADJACENT WIRES SHORTED TOGETHER	ADJACENT WIRES SHORTED TOGETHER ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES SHORTED TO COMMON GROUND, ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES SHORTED TOGETHER	ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES SHORTED TOGETHER ALL EQUIP FAULTED TO GND	ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES OPEN ADJACENT WIRES SHORTED TOSETHER	ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES SHORTED TO COMMON GROUND, RELAYS FAULTED OPEN AND CLOSED	ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES FAULTED OPEN SHORTED TO COMMON GROUND ADJACENT WIRES SHORTED		
- 5		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				AD)		
ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT EFFECT(S)	WIRE BUNDLES SEVERED PINCHED TOGETHER, GROUNDED & MELTED	HIRES PINCHED TOGE- THER WIRE BUNDLES SEVERED & GROUNDED TO STRUC- TURE WIRE BUNDLES MELTED TOGETHER	WIRE BUNDLES MELTED TOGETHER ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS HEAT DANAGED	WIRE BUNDLES SEVERED WIRES PINCHED TO- GETHER	WIRING SEVERED & GROUNDED TO STRUCTURE. RELAYS CRUSHED	WIRE BUNDLES SEVERED OPEN OR SHORTED TO COMMON GROUND WIRES PINCHED TO- GETHER		
	 	v 0	3- 01	•	•	:		
DAMAGE MECHARISH	VITY & NECONSTRUCTORY IN	LEADING	S FROM	M TUR- OLLOWED	S AND	e6 98		
70	VIOLENT FORCES DUE TO INERTIA, GRAVITY & WIND FOLLOWED BY IMPACT & FIRE	IMPACT FORCES ON RH INBOARD WING LEADING EDGE TENSILE FORCES & GND FIRE	HEAT & FLAMES FROM BURNING HYDRAULIC FLUID & TIRES	SHRAPNEL FROM TUR- BINE WHEEL FOLLOWED BY FIRE	BLOWN TIRE SECTIONS STRUCK RELAYS AND WIRING	METAL SHEARING & CRUSHING		· .
w		KER AND	Y- :- ACE	N	ULIC CTRI-	H. FT EER-		
CAUSE	AIRCRAFT FAILED STRUCTURALLY IN TURBULENCE - EXCESSIVE BANK ANGLE	MID-AIR COLLI- SION MITH TANKER MING FAILURE AND FIRE AFTER LAND- ING	PRESSURIZED HY- DRAULIC FLUID LEAK ON BRAKE FRICTION SURFACE	NO. 4 ENGINE STARTER TURBINE DISINTEGRATED	TIRE FAILURE SEVERED HYDRAULIC LINES AND ELECTRI- CAL WIRING	COLLISION WITH: PARKED AIRCRAFT DUE TO FAILED BRAKES AND STEER- ING		
	AIRCRAFT FA STRUCTURALI TURBULENCE EXCESSIVE A	HID-AI SION W HING F FIRE A	PRESSU DRAUL I LEAK O FRICTI	NO. 4 STARTE DISINT	TIRE F SEVERE LIMES CAL WI	COLLISI PARKED DUE TO BRAKES ING		
ABHOR'IAL ENV IRORMENT	CRASH/FIRE	CRASH/FIRE		•	•			
ABNOR1AL ENVIRORM	CRASE	CRASE	FIRE	FIRE	FIRE	CRASH		
OPERATIONAL MODE	Ļш	r- Ling/	- 9 8	₹		•	at .	
OPERA MODE	FL IGHT CRU I SE	FL IGHT- REFUEL ING/ LAND ING	GROUND- POST- LANDING TAXI	FL IGHT- TAKEOFF	FL IGHT- TAKEOFF	GROUND-		
CASE	æ	o,	. 10.	÷	12.	ř.		
				4-226		•		

TABLE 4.3-3 CRASH/FIRE DAMAGE ANALYSIS FINDINGS

DAMAGE MODES	FEASIBLE LOCATIONS	ELECTRICAL FAULTS
O WIRE BUNDLES SEVERED	O INBOARD WING LEADING EDGE	O ADJACENT WIRES SHORTE
O WIRING PINCHED TOGETHER	o INBOARD WING ROOT	TOGETHER.
O WIRING SHORTED TO STRUCTURE	O EXTERNAL STORES STRUT	O ADJACENI WIRE BUNDLES
O WIRE BUNDLES MELTED TOGETHER	LEADING EDGE	FAULTED OPEN, UR SH
O ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS	o MAIN LANDING GEAR	TO COMMON GROUND.
HEAT DAMAGED	WHEEL WELL	O ALL EQUIPMENT IN AN
O RELAYS CRUSHED	O LOWER FORWARD CREW	ASSEMBLY SHORTED TO
O COMPONENTS CRUSHED	COMPARTMENT	GROUND.
O WIRE BUNDLE INSULATION CHARRED	· o CREW COMPARTMENT	O SHORT CIRCUITS BEIME
CPACKED INSII	EQUIPMENT BAYS	ADJACENT PINS.
RETHERN DING	O WEAPONS BAY IN FUSELAGE	o LOSS OF POWER FED BY
מר ישררון יינוס	o BODY PRODUCTION BREAK	FAULTED COMPONENT.
	BULKHEAD FORWARD	٠
	OF WING	



4.3.5 Conclusions

As a result of the accident analysis, the abnormal environments were defined in terms of generalized fault modes for use in the power and load analyses of B-52 and FB-lll aircraft nuclear weapon circuitry. It was concluded that under crash/fire conditions, wire-to-wire short circuits were confined to common cables and connectors in all known cases. It was also concluded that internal short circuits may result from any wire contacting any other wire in the same component. The accident analysis confirmed that faults postulated for the power and load analysis are feasible.

APPENDIX A

B-52G/FB-111A

TECHNICAL DATA UTILIZED

FOR POWER AND LOAD ANALYSIS

D2-118576 -1

TABLE A1
B-52G DOCUMENTATION

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T.O. NUMBER	DATE	REV.	TITLE
1B-52G-1	4/15/75	Change 1	B-52G Flight Manual
1B-52G-2-12	12/20/74	Change 55	Electrical Systems and Data
1B-52G-2-14	9/30/74	Change 15	Airplane Systems Wiring Diagrams and Data
1B-52G-2-23	12/15/74	Change 16	Electronic Wiring Diagrams and Data
1B-52G-2-26	5/30/75	Change 8	Bombing-Navigational System
1B-52G-2-31	3/1/75	Change 38	Bomb Release System
1B-52G-2-39GA-	1/15/75		B-52/AGM-69A Weapon System

TABLE A1 .
B-52G DOCUMENTATION (Continued)

BOEING DRAWINGS		
DRAWING NUMBER	REVISION	TITLE
21A13198	D	Equipment Diagram Distribution Processor Group, Signal Data, B-52
25-2866	В	Box Installation Right Hand Forward DC Power
25-3541	AA	Equipment Installation Electrical, Section 41
25-5049	. F	Power Box Assembly - DC Right Hand Forward (Item A216)
25-5067	D	Power Box Assembly - DC Left Hand Forward (A217)
25-5231	G	Panel Installation Circuit Breaker, RH Load Central (All3)
25-5235	K	Panel Installation Circuit Breaker, Aft BNS Overhead (A174)
25-5557	C	Shield Installation DC Power LH Forward
25-7231	E	Electrical Bundle - Bomb IND Panel, Assy
25-7383	E	Electrical Bundle - Inflight Control & Monitor Assembly
25-7410	G	Electrical Bundle - Control Flare Pro- gramming, Assy
25-8054	P	Equipment Installation LH Side Panel, BNS Operations' Station
25-10091	A	Equipment Installation - Panel Stowage, Special Weapons
25-12066	В	Fuse Installation - TR Unit No. LH DC Fower Box, Kit
25-12403	L	Electrical Installation - Armament Provisions, Kit
31-3516		Wire Harness
31-3564		Wire Harness
35-5417	D	Electrical Bundle - Section 43, Assy of

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TABLE A1 B-52G DOCUMENTATION (Continued)

BOE I	ING	DR/	IWA	NGS

Drawing Number	REVISION	TITLE
35-5419	E	Electrical Bundle - Section 43 Assy of
35-5427	н	Electrical Bundle - Section 41, Assy of
35-5497	D	Electrical Bundle - Section 43, Assy of
35-5531	D	Electrical Bundle - Section 41, Assy of
35-11014	В	Shield Instl. DC Power, LH FWD (A217)
35-11016	L	Panel Instl Circuit Breaker, RH Load Central (All3)
35-11301	· F	Power Shield Assy DC, LH Fwd (A217)
35-11302	F	Power Shield, Assy - DC RH Fwd
35-11362	A	Electrical Bundle - Simplified Weapon Provision - Kit, Assy of
35-12642	F	Panel Assy, Pilots Readiness SW
35-12749	c ·	Package Instl Radar Pressure, BNS
35-12778	E	Panel Installation - Pilots Readiness (D&W) Switch
35-12938	Α ·	Electrical Bundle - Section 43, Assy of
35-12939	С	Electrical Bundle - Section 43, Assy of
35-13009	D	Electrical Bundle - Armament Prov's Wiring, Assy of
35-13562	С	Electrical Bundle - Control Flare Programming, Assy of
35-13810	A	Relay Installation - In-Flight Control, Fwd and Aft
35-13841	E	Kit Installation - Readiness P/W Switch For Nuclear Safety
35-14355	В	Electrical Bundle - Inflight Control and Monitor, Assy of

BOEING DRAWINGS

DRAWING NUMBER	REVISION	TITLE
35-18096	В	Kit Installation - Resistance Improv Monitor Control Circuits
35-27389	A	Circuit Breaker Instl. Kit - LH Fwd DC Power Box, AGM69A, (A217)
35-28617	C	Controller Instal. Kit - Coded Switch Set and P/L
35-28618	. B	Relay Location Instl. Kit - In-Flight Control, Fwd & Aft and P/L
35-28621	A	Switch Installation Kit - Code Enabling and P/L
35-29121	D	Wiring Harness Instal. Kit - Coded Switch Set and P/L
		4
35-29257	T	Wiring Harness Instl. Kit - AGM-69A Missile System Provisions
35-58616	A .	Interconnection Box Instl. Kit - Coded Switch System
39-24573	Basic	Panel Assy Kit - IFC Power Select, Battery & Xmfr. Rect.
39-24574	Basic	Panel Instal. Kit - DCU - 9A Power, BNS Side Console

D2-1185/6 -1
TABLE A1
B-52G DOCUMENTATION (Continued)

AUTONETICS DRAWINGS

Drawing Number	REVISION	TITLE
WL30892-501	A	Wire List - Network Interconnect Memory/ Logic
30863-501	C	Sch. DiaNo. 1 Input Output Network
30867-501	В	Sch. DiaNo. 2 Input Output Network
30871-501	A	Sch. DiaNo. 1 Arithmetic Control Network
30875-501	В	Sch. DiaNo. 2 Arithmetic Control Network
30879-501	A	Sch. Dia Power Control and Clock Network
30883-501	A	Sch. Dia Digit Network
30887-501	В	Sch. Dia Selection Network
30891-501	D	Sch. Dia Current Source and Timing Network
31701-501	В	Sch. Dia Voltage Regulator
31707-501	Basic	Sch. Dia Filtering Network
31710-501	Basic	Sch. Dia Timing Network _
31715-501	Basic	Sch. Dia Regulator, Voltage-Series
31721-501	Basic	Sch. Dia Power Converter

TABLE A1
B-52G DOCUMENTATION (Continued)

DRAWING NUMBERS	REVISION	SHEETS	TITLE
WL30892-501-1	A	218	Wire List - Network Interconnect Memory/Logic
30863-501	Basic B Basic C C C Basic A C Basic C	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Schematic Diagram - No. 1 Input Output Network
30867-501	Basic Basic Basic Basic B Basic A A Basic B	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Schematic Diagram - No. 2 Input Output Network
30871-501	Basic A Basic A A A A A A	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Schematic Diagram - No.1 Arithmetic Control Network
30875-501	Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic Basic	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Schematic Diagram - No. 2 Arithmetic Control Network

TABLE A1
B-52G DOCUMENTATION (Continued)

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DRAWING NUMBERS	REVISION	SHEETS	TITLE
30875-501 (Cont.)	Basic Basic A Basic Basic B	11 12 13 14 15 16	Schematic Diagram - No. 2 Arithmetic Control Network
30879-501	Basic Basic Basic Basic A	1 2 3 4 5	Schematic Diagram - Power Control and Clock Network
30883-501	Basic A A A A	1 2 3 4 5	Schematic Diagram - Digit Network
30887-501	Basic Basic Basic A B B	1 2 3 4 5 6	Schematic Diagram - Selection Network
30891-501	Basic C D	1 2 3	Schematic Diagram - Current Source And Timing Network
31701~501	Basic B	1 2	Schematic Diagram - Voltage Regulator
31707-501	Basic	1	Schematic Diagram - Filtering Network
31710-501	Basic	1	Schematic Diagram - Timing Network
31715-501	Basic	1	Schematic Diagram - Regulator, Voltag Series
31721-501	Basic	1	Schematic Diagram - Power Converter
21A11007	Basic	2001.001	Power Regulator Unit

TABLE A2 FB-111 DOCUMENTATION

DOCUMENT NUMBER	TITLE	
T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-1 T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-11-1 T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-13-1 T.O. 1F-111(B)A-2-14 T.O. 11829-3-25-2 T.O. 11829-3-25-12 T.O. 11F9-2-2, -3, -4 T.O. 11F97-2-2, -3, -4 T.O. 11N-T5036-2-3-4 T.O. 11N-T5037-2-3-4 T.O. 11N-T5054-2-3-4 T.O. 11N-T5055-2-3-4 T.O. 16W6-23-2	General Aircraft Information Armament Systems Electrical Power & Lighting Systems Wiring Diagrams Aircraft Bomb Ejector Rack Assy Aircraft Bomb Ejector Rack Assy Electronic Command Signals Programmer Electronic Command Signals Programmer Stores Control Panel Station Program Units Control Monitor DCU-137A Station Program Units Station Program Units Weapons System Pivot Pylon Assy Minutes of the Nuclear Weapons F-111 Model, Designation, and Series Project Officers Meeting (NW F-111 MDS POM 74-2)	
Report - Leach Corp. to General Dynamics Corp. File No. 222-19-68 Dated March 26, 1968	Subject: Monitor Relay (9324-8245) Technical Data	
Memo Leach Corp. to General Dynamics Corp. (No Number) Dated September 26, 1968	None - Referencing above report with corrections and additional data.	
MIL-W-81044	Military Specification for Standard Silver Coated Copper Wire	
C2697	General Dynamics Standard SCD for Circuit Breaker - Push-Pull, High Temperature, Trip Free	
	Texas Instrument TC Series Circuit Breaker Data	